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During recent years some western observers asserted that the 
Chinese Communist movement is a real nationalistic campaign, 
without showing in detail just how the Chinese Communists have 
been conducting this nationalistic campaign. The writer, as a 
native Chinese, felt that some interpretation should be made of 
the matter tor western observers. Thus, the topic of this thesis, 
"Anti-Foreignism in the Chinese Communist Appeal," was adopted at 
the suggestion of a member ot the Loyola University Faculty. 
The subject matter of this paper is not intended to disprove 
such Western interpretations; it is intended rather to supplement 
them by showing how the Chinese Connnunists have utilized the 
historical Chinese anti-foreign movement to induce the Chinese 
people to hate foreigners. Within the subject matter there are 
two aspects to be dealt with, namely, anti-foreignism itself and 
the Chinese Co~~unist appeal to it. The latter aspect is the most 
important and 1s mainly discussed in Chapters II, III and IV. 
The term tfanti-foreignism·' is one adopted by Nestern writers. 
Most of Chinese intellectuals do not concede that there was or 1s 
any anti-foreignism in China. These Chinese intellectuals use the 
term tlpatriotism" in place ot anti.foreignism, though the meanings 
1 
ii 
of these two terms are in discrepancy. They use the tlpatriotism tl 
because they regard activities against foreigners as defensive and 
patriotic movements. The writer, however, believes that basically 
there is anti-foreignism in China, and that it might even be 
regarded as race prejudice. He believes that because of the 
repeated military defeats of China in the past, anti-foreignism 
has become stronger than ever before. Therefore, he is inclined 
to think that the term ttanti-foreignism" is more suitable. 
Chapters are arranged chronologically. The first chapter 
attempts to show the characteristics of anti-foreignism before the 
Revolution of 1911. In this way, the problem of terminology 
mentioned above---anti-foreignism and patriotism---would be solved 
Further, although evidences of modern Communism did not appear 
before the Revolution, some examples of the anti-foreign movement 
cited in the first chapter have been repeated under Communist 
operation during the revolutionary course of China. Therefore, it 
might be said that the anti-toreign events in the early days are 
relevant to those of more recent t1mes. 
The second chapter, which covers the period 1911 to 1930, 
discusses the anti-foreign movement's new tide under the influence 
of Communism: tirst, the influence of Communism on sun Yat Sen 
in carrying on the anti-imperialist tasks, with an analysis of 
Sun's influence on his tollowers, second, the Communist theories 
on the anti-imperialist revolution were selected because they were 
p 
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regarded as applicable and attractive for the Chinese revolutionar 
mind. Consequently, same cases of the attacks against foreigners 
are cited in this chapter. Evidences of the Communist influence 
and cooperation behind the seene of anti-foreign events were 
introduced. 
From 1931 to the last World War resistance against Japan had 
been the Chinese public demand, and the "United Front" against 
Japan became the main tactical slogan of the Chinese Communists. 
Therefore, in Chapter III discussion is ooncentrated on the 
Communist anti-Japanese campaign, which had greatly aided the 
development of the Chinese Communist movement. 
The Decent Communist ttanti-American and pro-Russian" program 
must be dealt wit~, of course, and this is the subject of Chapter 
IV. Emphasis 1s put on anti-American movement 1n keeping with the 
subject. 
Materials ooncerning Communist statements and propaganda 
were oollected either from the writings of ComT.'lunists themselves 
or from other writers, most of whom have been first-hand observers 
in the Chinese Communist areas. No material was taken from Kuo 
Min Tang sources in order to avoid possible misinterpretation or 
exa.ggeration. 
A great percentage of materials concerning the Chinese anti-
foreign movement used in the opening two ohapters was taken from 
Western writers~ who are assumed to be fairly objective. Most 
iv 
of them have been in China. 
This thesis stJ-lves to evaluate the Chinese anti-foreign 
movement as a soclal faotor in·Chinese Communist growth. But it 
does not conolude that Communism in China is a "new nationalismtf 
as Clement Attlee insisted in August, 1954. The Chinese Communist 
have made use of nationalism to help them in their struggle toward 
..-..-....~ .......... -
theiJ- Communist goal. 
Furthermore, sinoe the Chinese Communists came into power, 
they have made every effort to create a new anti-American and pro-
Russian movement, which is contrary to the Chinese traditional 
feeling. Traditionally, the attitude of the Chinese public toward 
Amerioans is ratheJ- more favorable than toward Russians. 
According to the Communist teachings everything American is evil, 
and everything Russian is good. Thus, inevitably a great deal of 
fabrication and exaggeration has been inserted in the Communist 
teachings, as we shall see in Chapter IV. Psychologically 
speaking, if the Chinese Com'1'lunists continue to teach their people 
that only America is the imperialist and the enemy of the Chinese 
people, and that only Russia 1s the democratic leader and the 
friend of the Chinese people, which is contJ-ary to the fact and 
the Chinese feeling, a general psychical reaction would renew a 
deep hatJ-ed against Russia and the Red regime. This expectation 
1s also the purpose of this paper. 
-CHAP'EER I 
TH.E ROOT AND NATURE OF ANTI-FOREIGNISM BEFORE 1911 
As a preliminary to a discussion of the Communist influence 
on the anti-toreign movement in China, anti-foreignism itself 
must be evaluated. The root and nature of anti-foreignism must be 
explained, since Ohinese intelleotuals have rationalized anti-
foreignism as patriotism, since anti-foreignism is traditional and 
responsible for the attacks on foreigners of the last few decades, 
and since it created the Chinese psychological demand, which has 
been utilized by the Chinese Communists in th&ir campaign against 
"foraign imperiali~.n 
In explaining the cause of anti-foreignism, Chinese intellec-
tuals used to assert that the foreign aggressors put an 
"imperialist yoke on China"; the foreigners "despise Chinese"; 
the Great Powers intend to "slice up China." However, any real 
explanation must deal with what might be called Chinese "ethno-
centrism, tt the psychological factor revealed by Chinese history, 
which accou.nts for the hostile attitude toward foreigners. 
In the early days, the Chinese knew little or nothing about 
the other peoples of the world. They held in their minds a 
1 
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picture of themselves as a nation of superiority and supremacy. 
They did not like intercourse with the foreigners, whose conduct 
they despised. l It may be worthwhile to present some specific 
examples of ethnocentrisM or the Chinese feeling of supremacy. 
The portuguese after 1514 made the first real attempts to 
establish diplomatic relations with China for the purposes ot 
trade. In 1517 Thomas Pires was sent to Canton as ambassador by 
the King ot portugal. But at the end ot 1519, because ot a rumor, 
he and his companies,were accused ot being spies and imprisoned 
under an order of the Son of Heaven. Later, the Portuguese 
government sent Simon d'Andrede to be an ambassador. In his 
dealing with the Chinese officials he got trouble. He was attack-
ed by a Chinese fleet in a Chinese coast and only a storm which 
scattered the ships enabled him to escape. 2 The reason tor such 
treatment is simple. The Son of Heaven in Peking reigned in 
ceremonious majesty, and refused to accept any other ruler as an 
equal. He conSistently endeavored to reduce dangerous contacts 
with outer world. 3 The Spanish and Dutch, to1lowing the Portu-
guese, had the same trouble with China during the years 1588 to 
lChao Kao-Min, Essay ~ Chinese ~ Foreigners, (Mukden, 
China, 1925), p. 20. 
2a.F. Hudson, h~rOte and China, A survet of Their Relations, From the Earlist Times 0 mO, (London, lCj3 )-;-PP. 236.,... 231. 
---- ...... .......-.. 
3Ibid., p. 235. 
-
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Before the end of ei~hteenth century England made a great 
effort to open direct diplomatic relations with China and to 
obtain a treaty regulating the trade. In 1792 Lord Macartney was 
appointed ambassador to China and sent out with instructions to 
press tor the opening of ports, but he was unsuccessful. In 1816 
England tried once more but tailed again. The mandate of the 
Chinese Emperor Chtien Lung to King George III implied that China, 
being the only civilized nation of the world, had no use for 
foreign goods.5 
As time went on, the efforts of foreigners to obtain trade 
with China met with some success, because Chinese merchants came 
to desire foreign trade. The provinCial authorities, for a con-
sideration, permited it,.,and the officials of the central gover~ 
ment pretended not to notice it, as long as there was no question 
ot diplomatic reoognition. Since the foreign traders were looked 
upon as "barbari~nsn, the Chinese provincial authorities set up 
certain rules regulating the behavior of both the Chinese and 
foreign traders in order that the Western "barbarians" could not 
contaminate the "superior" Chinese. It was forbidden that Chinese 
merchants be in debt to foreigners; on no account could Western 
43• Wells Williams, ! History ££ China, (New York, 1891), 
PP. 80-81, PP. 83-85. 
5Hudson, p. 266. 
--
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traders hire Chinese servants. Europeans were prQhibited from 
using sedan chairs; no foreign traders were allowed to row on the 
river except at specified times three days a month when they had 
to be aocompanied by a Chinese interpreter who was held account-
able for their misdeeds, when the trading season was over, the 
foreign traders had to leave China; only a few foreigners could 
live in the Chinese factories, if a trader strayed, it meant cer-
tain death. 6 
In the sixteenth oentury the Chinese spoke of themselves as 
"we," the chosen people. the people of glorious destiny, the 
saviours of civilization. whereas ttthey"---the foreigners---were 
the inferior people, the unworthy_ The physioal appearance and 
the conduct ot westerners were so unoouth and "barbaric" according 
to Chinese "standards" tha.t they were looked upon in no sense 
truly human by the Chinese people. One scholarly Chinese observer 
who met a number of Jesuit priests in his travels wrote a letter 
to his friend that these nocean men lt are tall beasts with deep 
sunken eyes and beak-like noses; they had hair on their bodies 
like the monkeys of Southern China, they seem to possess none of 
the mental faculties of men, although they are in some aspects 
clever and go from place to place with self-reliance of a man of 
scholarship; it is quite possible that they are susceptible 
------.---------
6Arnold J. Toynbee, ! study £! Ristorl, (London, 1934), II, 
232. 
~~ training and could be taught the modes of conduot proper to a 
human being, but it would take oonsiderable patienoe. 7 
As time went on, new .forms of hatred against "foreign devils" 
appeared. A Western expert on Ohina, who was the former president 
of the Imperial University of Peking during the Manchu dynasty. 
stated: "So tar trom being new, an anti-toreign spirit is the 
normal state of the Ohinese mind • • • • Where everything is 
ehangin&, the temper of people has undergone a ohange. They have 
beoome restless as the sea and tickle as a weather wave. The 
friends of yesterday are become the enemies of today; and a slight 
or petty annoyanoe is enough to make them transfer man or oountry 
from one to the other category. Murderous outbreaks, rare in the 
past, have now become alarmingly trequent. u8 An instanoe at suoh 
an outbreak would be the Boxers' Rebellion of 1900, in whioh more 
than three hundred westerners were killed. The slogan of Boxers 
was ItFu-Ohtlng Mleh-Yang" ("assist Oh'ing Dynasty a.nd destroy 
ocean men' It) 
Ohristianity came trom the West to China. Consequently 
Christianity was looked upon as merely another foreign thing by 
tM Chinese literati; the missionaries were denounced as seditious 
disturbers ot the civilized Chinese SOCiety. The Christian missio 
7Rlchard T. La Piere and Paul R. Farnsworth. Social PSlcho-!2sl, 2nd ed., (New York, 1942), p. 154. 
_I ~w. A. P. Martin, ~ Awakening £! China, (London, 1907) • 
...n.... ;-1111 
6 
was never to enjoy uninterrupted prosperity in China. In 1616 a 
severe persecution arose because a Chinese official, jealous ot 
the Catholic scholars, hated them. Under his agitation an edict 
was entorced at Peking and Nanking; several toreignmisslonaries 
were apprehended and sent to Macao. In 1622, due to the activity 
of the same hostile official, the persecution was renewed and 
again the missionaries were forced either to tlee or to go into 
hiding. Again the reason urged was that foreign missionaries were 
seditious.9 
The work of Christianity in China during the last years of 
the Ming dynasty (1368-1643) and the first years ot the Manchu 
dynasty (1644-1911) was rudely interrupted. Chinese astronomers, 
jealoua of the Jesuits who had imported the Western calendars. 1n 
1664 took advantage ot the ignorance of the very young ruler, 
Ktang Hsi, to launch an accusat~on against the foreign m!ssion~ 
aries. As a result of this accusation twenty-five missionaries 
were taken to canton and imprisoned, and three of them died of 
their sU£ferings.10 
From 1723 to 1736 the Church was overtaken by a more severe 
persecution than it had known betore. The basic cause are that 
the Chinese literati had a deep-seated distrust of the white 
9Kenneth Scott Latourette, A Historl of Christian 
China, (New York, 1929), p. 103.- --
Mission in 
-
10 5 Ibid., P. 11 • 
-
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missionaries, and there was a fear that the increasing numbers of 
missionaries might lead to foreign aggrhssion. In December 1723 
and in January l72!~ a great number of missionaries in }4uchow we.r>e 
expelled and the church buildings were confiscated, and the 
Christians had to renounce their faith under edict.ll 
In the year l7~7 a violent attack on the Church broke out in 
Fukien province. The Spanish priests and the Vicar Apostolic ot 
Fukien were arrested and ~trangled. Two huropean Jesuits also 
were strangled.12 
As time went on the anti-Ohristian movement beoame more and 
more fierce. The Chinese people, like the pagans of anc1ent Rome, 
charged the foreign missionaries with horrible crimes, and seized 
the slightest occassion tor murderous attack. Cases of murdered 
missionaries and of fabricated accusations against them were 
fairly common in the past history ot ChIna.13 The missionaries 
were accused of killIng the little children in the mission orphan-
ages and foundling hospitals for the sake of obtaining their 
hearts and eyes for magical purposes. such accusations occurred 
in the cities ot Kuangtung and Szechuan in 1884 and 1886, 
respectively. In 1890-1891 the attacks on missionaries occurred 
llIbid., Pp. 159-161. 
- . 




in widely separated localities and were accompanied by much 
violence. 14 These charges or accusations were usually made by the 
masses, and led by the prominent members of gentry.15 Similar 
charges are made by the Chinese Communists of the present. 
Charges of kidnaping children and selling them for immoral 
purposes were also made in the Chinese Courts. In tilay 1870, a 
number ot children had disappeared in Tientsin, and rumor charged 
the Catholic orphanage with responsibility. As a result of this 
chnrge the Catholic Cathedral, orphanage, and French Consulate 
.ere destroyed; priests, nuns, and French men and women were 
killed.16 "In China," Martin wrote, "if a man falls in the street 
the priest and Levite consult their own satety by keeping at a 
distance, and if a good Samaritan stoops to pick him up it is at 
perll."17 
The Chinese people over the centuries have hated foreigners; 
at the same time they held a prejudice against those Chinese who 
adopted, more or less, Western culture or who studied abroad. 
An instance to show how a Chinese offioial refleoted this bias 
toward students studying overseas is reflected in the experience 
14Edward Thomas Williams, ! Short History £! China, (New York 
1928), pp. 353, 389. 
l5Ibid., p. 354. 
-
16Ibid., pp. 324-325. 
-
l7Martin, p. 262. 
9 
of Yung Wing, the first Chinese student who studied in Amerioa. 
He was graduated by Yale University in 1854. He later beoame the 
Commissioner, then of the Government of Manohu, and sent one hun-
dred and twenty Chinese students to study in the United states. 
These students, before oompleting their ourioula, were oalled baok 
in 1881. The reoall was due to the intrigues of biased offioials. 
One of the hostile offioials was Woo Tze-Tung, Yung Wing's new 00-
oommissioner. He opposed Yung Wing's plan and in 1876 sent 
Peking reports with malicious misrepresentations about the 
students. Yung Wing in his own biography wrote about Woo Tze-Tung 
as follows, 
Instead of laying those oomplaints before me, he 
clan-destinely started a stream of misrepresentations to 
Peking about the studentsJ how they had been mismanaged 
••• how they had been allowed to enjoy more privileges 
than was good for them; how they imitated American 
st'ldents in athletios; how they play m01"6 than they 
studied, that they formed themselves into seoret societies, 
both religious and political; that they ignore their 
teachers and would not listen to the advioe of the new 
commissioner; that they were allowed to have their own 
way, they would soon lose their love for their own 
country, and on their return to China, they would be good 
for nothin,g or worse than nothing; that most of them went 
to Church, attended Sunday sohool and had became 
Christians; that the sooner this educational enterprise 
was bI"oken up and all the students reca.lled, the better 
it would be for China, 8tc.l~ 
Why were the Chinese usually sO hostile to the learning of 
Weste1"n ways of life as above? A typical interpretation of anothe 
po. 
18yung Wing, ~ ~ .!.!! China ~ Ameri oa, (New York, 1909), 
204-205. 
10 
Chinese official who had resided in England for years asserted 
that "Our civilization is • • • a moral order; while in yours we 
detect only an economic chaos." And European civilization "has 
produced manners so coarse, morals so low, and an appearance so 
unlovely" that there could be no comparison with Chinese 
standards.19 
About religion this Chinese official said, "Your religion 
has less influence on your society; you protess Christianity, but 
your civilization has never been Christian."20 Again he went on, 
"tour religion is less practical and it is not for the unity of 
human race." ,Furthermore, "Your religionJ Alas, it is in the 
name of that you are doing unna..'l11able deedsl 1t21 The teachings ot 
the Church on asceticisM, priesthood, heaven and hell, and 
spiritual and temporal life, are all satirized by the same Chinese 
orricial. 22 VJhat is the Chine se religion? "Ours is Contucian 
through and the through' But to sa.y that it is Conf'ueia.n, it is 
llorall"23 
19Letters From A Chinese Official (Being an Eastern View of 
W •• tern Civl11zitI'OnT, [origInally puba.ished in Enp.:land, and then 
published tl}e U. s. i1 (New York, 190), po. 5, 10. 
20Ibid· 6 
-., p •• 
2l~., pp. 6, 24, 5lt-. 
22.!.2!.2.., p. 55. 
23Ibid 6 




Concerning arts and literature, the otficial criticized the 
west this way: "Your outer sense as well as your inner is dead, 
you are blind and deat."24 His 1dea was essentially that every-
thing concerning China is better than the things of the west; 
even to send children to school in Europe could not do any good 
for the family and SOCiety since the Chinese d1d not send their 
children to sOhool. 25 Europeans are "poor", "incompetent", and 
"foolish" 1n oomparison with Chinese people. 26 It is curious 
enough that the official also wrote that "no man in China is 
isolated,f1 and "it is not so easy for him to starve;" also a 
Chinese "has no temptation to cheat and oppress. tt27 
This Chinese official retlected a general attitude of the 
Chinese intellectuals toward Western civilization and an oppositio 
to the learning ot the west. The Chinese students who studied in 
toreign countries returned in disgraoe, and the old literati 
looked upon them with suspicion. This is true even 1n the writer' 
experience. Students returning from abroad heard sarcasm, such 
a8 "The moon in a foreign country must be brighter than that in 
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Chinese, your parents are no longer your paren.ts because you are 
democratic now'" The writer has heard from his former teachers in 
China that "We have everything what the foreign countries have, 
don't self-belittlel Many things had been learned from Ohina by 
westerners. 'Weapons and guns, making paper, printing, compass, 
and so forth, were invented by Chinese, which the westerners 
learned from us; we have a civilization ot five thousand years, 
while other countries are small and have but short histories." 
This is the general notion ot Chinese and something that Chinese 
people like to talk about. 
The Chinese not only despised Caucasoid foreigners; they des-
pised the Japanese as well. According to Chinese history, the 
Japanese people haYe nothing ot a natiye culture except that 
which they learned and adopted trom China, and the ancestors ot 
the Japanese are the Chinese who were sent to Japan in 219 B.C. by 
the Shi Huan Ti, the king ot the T'sing dynasty. Since the 
Japanese people are physically shorter than the Chinese in general 
the apoellation of "Japaneseft was not used by the Chinese in 
ancient times. The Japanese had been called "Wo Nu ff ("shortie-
Ilaven ) trom the beginn:i.ng of sixth century by the Chinese. Mter 
the tourteenlih century the Japanese had been nicknamed "wo Kow" 
("shortie-pirate") by the Chinese historians of the Tang dynasty. 
!here tore !l~fo Nu" or "Wo Kow" has been used in the textbooks of 
~ ~dern China, and the oountry or Japan has been styled as "Wo Kuo" 
13 
("shortie-nation't). The Chinese people, particularly women, do 
not like to marry Japanese. Although some instances of mixed 
marriages occur, a Chinese who married a Japanese would evole the 
criticism of his countrymen. The basic reason is that the Japanes 
is regarded as "brutal", "wild" or "shorttt • Realistically, while 
the Chinese have oontempt for the Japanese, they also have a fear 
of them because ot repeated deteats at the hands of the Japanese; 
contempt and tear engender hatred. "Down with the small Japan'" 
became a slogan in China. 
There is now a general agreement among the Chinese intellec-
tuals that during the very early days the Chinese acted against 
foreigners because of ignorance, which is not, of course, to be 
justified; but that in more recent times the anti-foreign attitude 
and movement should be justified on the ground that the Chinese 
people had to fight for abolition of the unequal treaties. Dr. 
Sun Yat Sen laid down his teaching that "the aim of revolution is 
to achieve the freedom and equality of China." However, when we 
study the very nature of the anti-foreign attitude in modern China 
we will discover it is not entirely as interpreted. For instance, 
during the twentieth century no tairminded person would insist 
that missionaries are "culture aggressors," but they, particularly 
the Catholic foreign pdests, are leoked upon with suspicion. 
~e seminarians in China, regarding their education in the 
~roreigntl mission seminary, used to say that "we are under the 
slave-education!" For another example, a servant of the Catholic 
foreign priest would sometimes say that "we have the worst food, 
while they, the foreign priests, have the best; there is no 
equality of man to man!tt 
It is worth noting that the writer holds that the Chinese 
anti-foreignism is intrinsically rooted in the "ethnocentrism,tt 
aggravated by a history of diplomatic humiliations, which have 
brought about a psychologioal tendency of hostility toward all 
"foreign devils." And, psychologically speaking, such a general 
tendency has been expoited by Chinese Communists in their struggle 
for power. Since this chapter was basically intended to deal with 
the Chinese anti-foreignism before the Revolution, the nature of 
historical anti-foreignism in modern China will be analJzed more 
broadly in the following chapters when the Chinese Communist 
appeal to it is oonsidered. 
~.. L... It --------------------------------------------------------~ 
CHAPTER II 
THE ftNEW TIDE" OF ANTI-FOREIGNISM UNDER 
COMMUNIST rr FLUENCE (1911-1930) 
After the outbreak of the Republio Revolution in 1911, some-
thing in China began to be new. A magazine edited by the £ounder 
of the Chinese Communist Party was renamed !!! Youth in September 
1915. Between 1917 and 1921 nearly four hundred student reviews 
appeared in China, most ot them containing the character for "new" 
in the title, such as: !!! Women, !!! Light, !!! World and even 
Hew Tide. l In an atmosphere receptive to new ideas, Huxley's 
--
Evo1ution~ Ethics, Darwin's Origin £! Species, Kidd's Social 
Evolution, Spencerts Principles £! Sociology, Mill's .Q!! Liberty, 
Montesquieu's ~ Spirit ~ ~. Rousseau's Social Contract, and 
Adam Smith's !h! Wealth 2£ Nations became favorite readings and 
provided questions for dtsoussion in student circ1es. 2 The rise 
-
1Robert Payne, Mao Tse-Tung, Ruler of China, (New York, 
1950), pp, 56-57. --- --
2Kiang Wen-Han, The Chinese Student Movement, (New York, 
1948), p. 22. ---
15 
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of modern Communism was contemporary and communist influence gave 
a new impetus to the anti-foreign movement. 
In dealing with the Communist influence on the new tide of 
anti-foreignism, the teachings of Sun Yat Sen must be discussed at 
first, because the anti-imperialist movement received its early 
impetus from Sun, who was influenced by Communism. 
Sun Yat Sen's Teachings 
What is the feeling of Dr. Sun Yat Sen, the Father of the 
Republic Revolution, regarding the "imperialist" pressure on 
China? His early declaration shows: "Our strong neighbours look 
down upon us and despise us for the reason that we are not one at 
heart • • •• If we do not rouse ourselves in time, our thousands 
of years of fame and culture, our many generations of traditions 
and morals will be destroyed, utterly ruined."3 
In a message to the Chinese people from overseas, he repeated 
his feeling that "we are men without a oountry. When we go to 
foreign la.nd. we are assaul~ed. '·4 But later he expressed his 
teeling in terms of their political lmportance. "China has been 
3sun Yat Sen, "An Address to Hsing-ChtmfS-Hui" (Association 
tor the Regeneration of China), (made in 1894J. The Teachin~s of 
~ Yat Sen, selections with introduction by N.-aingulee, Lonaon, ~p:l1. 
1 43un Yat Sen, !fA message to the Chinese People" (written in 
f 903), Gangulee, p. 29. 
-
11 
under the po:).itical domination of the ~<vest for a century," Sun 
stated, and "during the past century China has lost a huge amount 
of the territories. tl5 Economioally, he realized that "China has 
already endured several tens of years of economio domination from 
the Powers • • • • The result is that China is everywhere beoomin 
a colony of powers.,,6 Stung by intolerable humiliation, he devote 
his life to lead ,the task of the "emancipation of China from the 
imperialist yoke." It is Sun Yat Sen who advanced the slogan, 
"Down wi th Imperialism," wx-i tes a ~'estern observer. 'I To fight 
imperialism Sun Yat Sen preferred to use methods evolved by 
Communist theory, though he also adopted some of his ideas and 
principles from the American president Lincoln. 
That his attitude should be oriented to Communism is rather 
easily explainable. During 1896-1898 he studied Marxism in Europe 
and was influenced by it.8 Mox-eover, the success of the Russian 
ReYolutlon of 1917 ap'oealed to him deeply. PArly in 1918 he sent 
a congratulatory message to Lenin. He was informed that Lenin 
was giving his attention to the oppressed peoples of the East and 
5sun Yat Sen, ~ Min Chu 1 (Three peOile's prinoiples), 
trans. FrankW. Price, ~uhgKing ealtion, 94j}, p. jj. 
6 Ibid., pp. 37-38. 
-
p. 81:GUstov Amann~ !h! Le8ac1 £! ~ 1!l~, (New York, 1929), 
( 8Tang Leang-Li, The Inner History of the Chinese Revolution, London, 1930), p. 2~ - -
L= 
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had the intention of presenting a united front against the 
imperialist nations of the weat.9 In addition, the Paris Peace 
conference of 1918 offered only disapoointment for China. Chinese 
intellectuals were so shocked that they cried that the foreign 
nations were still selfish and militaristio and all were great 
liars. About ten thousand students paraded in the streets to 
demonstrate against the Paris Conference.10 Besides all this, on 
July 4, 1918, Chioherin, then Commissar for Foreign Affairs of 
Russia, declared that Bolshevik Russia had unilaterally renounoed 
all unequal Czarist treaties with China, as well as its agreements 
with Japan and other countries relating to China. This declara-
tion was again set forth in a manifesto issued on July 25, 1919.11 
In the years between 1919 and 1921.severa1 members of the Comin 
were working for the development of Communism in China. 
Lenin sent his secretary Mahlin to influence Sun Yat Sen. 
October, 1923, Borodin arrived at Canton and said to Sun: 




• • • • 
!he ultimate aims of the Ku.o Min Tang and the Third International 
ar8 not in conflict. n12 Borodin even became the adviser of Sun 
9Ibid., pp. 154-155. 
lOKiang Wen-Han, p. 37. 
2Dd IlHaro1d Rovert Isaac, The Tragedy of the Chirese Revolution, 
8d., (stanford, 1951), p:-60. -----
lZrang Leang-Li, p. 159. 
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of the Foreign Ministry thereafter.13 Thus, 1t is not surprising 
that Sun's teachings implied some Communist ideology. 
According to Sunts own testimony there was no such ca)1talist 
problem in China as in E..'u.rope. 14 And "China has not yet large 
land owners up to the present time," wrQte Sun, 'tshe only has had 
small landowners," therefore "all the Chinese people must be 
counted as poor • • •• Most places in China have been qu1et and 
oontent under this system and no tl'oubl·e has arisen between the 
people and landowners."IS Nevertheless, Sun added, "In reoent 
years, however, since the currents of Western economic 11fe have 
begun to rush into China, all of our old systems have undergone a 
process of change. ~he land question has felt the first and most 
serlous effects of the modern ~vest.rn impact. n16 He used Marxist 
theory 1n forming his "p~inciple of People's L1velihood" which was 
intended to solve the "economic dom1nat10n" and '·serious impact" 
of Western Powers. After a lengthy explanation of his principle 
he concluded that ttI can put distinction today between Communism 
and the Min-Shen.princ1ple [principle of People's LivelihoodV in 
this way; Communism is an ideal of Livelihood. while the Min-Shen 
13I2!£., pp. 160, 212, 233, 214. 
l4sun Yat Sen, The Internat10nal Development £r China. 2nd 
-d. (London, 1928), PP7 10, 139, 166. 
l5sun Yat Sen, San Min Chu I, pp. 41'7-418. 
~ ------ - ------- --~~ •• P. 4J.8. 
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Principle is practical Communism. There is no real difference 
between the two principles, the difference lies in the methods by 
which they are applied. tt17 He went on, "What is the Principle ot 
people t s Ll velihood? It is communism and socialism. ,,18 At !:\Oothe 
time he added that the "Russian Revolution is the same as that of 
San Min Chu r."19 Although sun in some places attacked Marxts 
theOry,20 he called Marx "the most famous schola.r of the world," 
claimed "he ['Marx] found the truth," and !this [Mar.x0 book is the 
2 
complete work ~or the human social thought of thousands of yearsV 
. At the same time, Lenin, according to Sun, was 'ta genius among the 
revolutionists, !Uld the best standard of the .Revolutlon.,,22 Such 
words of praise are Qommon in Sun's writings. 
To aohieve the aim of the Republic Hevolution Sun felt that 
some sort of unit,. wi th I,enin's U ~S.S.R. was indispensable. He 
stated, "Russia aims to cheek the strong and help tile wea1c; it 
advocates justice. • •• Russia's new policy aims at the over-
17Ibid., p. 416. 
-
18Ibid., p. 428. 
-
19sun Yat Sen, an address on t'The Interpretation on the 
Establishment of the Republic Gover·nntent" t (made in 1923,) quoted 
in Taue Shu-Tien, Sun Chung-Shan Yu KU~-Chien Chu I (Sun Yat Sen 
and Communism), (Hong Kong, i<i;li"r;-p.. - - - - -
20 Sun , San Min Chu I, pu. 401-406. 
-..-- ........... --- -- ' 
21Q,uoted in Taue Shu-T1en, pp. 6, 7. 
22Quoted 1n Tsue Shu-Tien, p. 7. 
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throw ot imperialism in the whole world; it aims at the overthrow 
of the capitalism of the world. H2) A letter of sun sent to the 
Central Executive of the U.S.S.R. betore his death in 1925 stated: 
While I li. here, My thoughts are turned toward 
you and towards the fate of my Party and my country. 
You are at the head of the Union of free Republics 
---that heritage left to the oppressed peoples of the 
world by the immortal Lenin. With the aid of that 
heritage the victims of imperialism will inevitably 
achieve emancipation from that international regime whose 
foundations have been rooted for ages in slavery, wars, 
and injustice. 
I leave behind me a Party which, as I always hope, 
will be bound ~p with you in the historic work of the 
final liberation of China and other exploited countries 
from the yo~e of imperialism • • • • 
Therefore I charge the Kuo Min Tang to continue the 
work ot the reVolutionary nationalist movement, so that 
China, reduced by the imperialists to the position ot 
semi-eolonial country, shall become free. 
Taking my leave of you, dear comrades, I want to 
express the hope that the 4&1 will soon come when the 
U.S.S.R. will welcome 8. friend and ally in a might, free 
China, and that in a great strugglt for the liberation 
of the oppressed peoples of the world botp those allies 
will go forward to victory hand in hand.2~ 
The importance of Sun's ~eachings 1s obvious. One might 
raise the questiQn of whether or not Sun tat Sen was a Communist. 
A.lthough neither the Kuo Mln Tang nor Chinese Communists cla1.med 
that Sun Yat Sen was a Communist, some Western authors hold a 
doubtful attltude. 25 The important thIng is that he made statemen 
-
23sun Yat Sen, San Min Chu I, po. 17, 18, 20. 
-- ------ -....-, -
2~tuoted in Hu Hua, ChUB! Kuo Rain Min Chu Chu I Ko Ming Sh~~ (Ih! Historl of Chinese New emoera~RiVOlutron), Ipeking, l~) 
Pp. 50-57. The letter also Is In Gangulee, pp. 55-5,). 
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which can be effectively used by Communists in the fighting of 
foreign imperialism. To study Sun Yat Sents teachings was 
required in all Chinese middle schools and universities for some 
years after the beginning of the period of politioal tutelage 
under the Kuo Min Tang. Students who learn the history of the 
repeated military defeats of China, are likely to be susceptible 
to Sun's principles. 
Furthermore, after Maroh 1927, the Kuo Min Tang under the 
leadersh1p of Wang Chin-\Ye1 (1884-1944) and Chiang Kai-shek began 
to expel the Communist Party from the collaboration government, 
which had been established by sun Yat Sen in 1924- Military clash 
between the Kuo Min Tang and the Chinese Communists had ensued 
from that time. On April IB, 1927, Chiang arrested some Communist 
leaders in Shanghai; again on April 21 he arrested the Soviet 
Union "adviser" BorodinJ and under' Chiang's order more than one 
hundred Red leaders were executed in Shanghaicwithout tr.tal. 26 
loreover, from 1927 to 1931 the Kuo Min Tang government broke 
diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union, which had been direct-
ing the Chinese Communist conspiracy to capture the Kuo Min Tang. 
SUch events dId not conform to the teachings of Sun, as illustrat-
ed in the last letter to the c.nt~al Executive of the U.S.S.R., 
York, 1931.1->, PP. 280-281. Aocording to the present writer, 
Ch1nese Comrnunists do not regard Sun Yat Sen as a Communist 
because Sun did not adopt Marxism absolutely. L __ 26 ... JTw.w!ih,IAh.iN[eu.IW~y~rCOI!E:r'Ii-i:k:T~1Lmue, JIl,a.....;A&Jln;aI':r:.11, ... 1~2·'l.1.,j .. .....&1~ QIs:../,., 27a....J;nl.l-....... 1 _______ ....J 
P' 
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quoted above. The Ch1nese Communists, therefore, from early days 
had cried out: "Kuo Min Tang's men are the traitors or Sun Yat Sen 
and his revolution," "Kuo Min Tang is the running dog of imperia-
lists," and "Kuo Min Tang is the anti .. revolution camp." The 
young Chinese students, remembering the words of Sun, could hardly 
be unimpressed by such charges. 
Four Chinese Communists' Theories ~ Fighting Foreign Imperialism 
Chen Tu-Hsius Chen Tu-Hsiu (1881-1942), the co-founder and 
the first leader of the Chinese Communist Party, believed that the 
repeated defeats of China were due to the Manchus. ignorance or 
"democracy and science." In his writings before 1919 Chen did not 
fall into Leninism absolutely. To liberate China Chen insisted 
that "democracy and scienee" were the pr'1ncipai needs. Since he 
realized the Republic Revolution failed, he accepted Marxism-
Leninism in toto by September 1920. 21 In Deoember 1920 Chents 
magazine !!!! Youth carried his article which exolaimed: "They 
accuse the Bolsheviks 'or disturbing the peace. Do not the Great 
Powers disturb the peace when they violate the sovereignty of 
l1I1all and weak cou.ntriesy t128 
According to communist theory, the class struggle of peasantr 
-
21Se .1a.min I. Schwartz, Chinese Communism and the Rise or 1':'ao (Cambridge, Ma ••• , 1951), p. 29. .;...;.._....0....;.; ......... - - - - -
~ 28Quoted in rug •• p. 22. 
jii> 
,.... 
and proletariat against the bourgeoisie is the important stage of 
the development of Communism. But to the Chinese Communist mind 
such struggle "is not only compatible with, but necessary to, the 
Chinese anti-imperialist, national revolution."29 Therefore, a 
great emphasis was put on this aspect by the Chinese Communist 
leaders. 
Since Chen believed that the basic aims of the Chinese 
revolution should be "to overthrow the oppression of international 
imperialism and to achieve the complete independence of the Chines 
nation," he considered that the bourgeoisie (mainly the intellec-
tuals] ought to lead the proletariat and peasantry in the struggle 
against foreign imperialism,30 because the latter were immature 
tor political action and they would incline toward conservatism. 31 
Also, Chen was willing to support the polioy of collaboration with 
the Kuo Min Tang, whioh had been decreed by the Comintern. 
Later Chen changed his attitude. In 1926 he stated, "The 
peasantry oonstitutes the overwhelming majority of the Chinese 
people, and is, of course, a great torce in the national 
29"Circular Letter of the CC [CCp] to all Party Members~' 
(August 1, 1921), cited in Bejamin I. Schwartz, A Documenta~ 
Ristorl £! Chinese Communism, (Cambridge, Mass.,-1952), p. 164. 
3°Hu Chiao-Mu. ~iatl Years of Communist P£ri~ of China. (Peking, 19$1), pp. , J a!so ViCtor A. Yakhon 0 , The ChInese 
§oviets, (New York, 193 ), pp. 122, 125. 
31schwartz, Chinese Communism and the Rise of Mao, p. 48 • 
.;:;.;:;;,;:;.;;;,:;:;;;:;;;.;;;:;;.::;;.;;;; ---- ....... -- --- ...... 
revolut1on."32 Chen concluded that "1f the Chinese revolution 
does not en11st the peasants, .. it will be most difficult for it to 
succeed as a great national revolution. H ]3 At the same time Chen 
evaluated highl,.. the role of the proletariat. "Because the 1forld 
has already moved into the stage of the world revolution," wrote 
Chen, nand because the Chinese proletarlat has already demonstrat-
ed that it has 1ts own independent political power and that it 1s 
actually the leader of the present revolution, our aims • • • are 
national independence and the overthrow of the feudal society.n34 
In his same statement Chen insisted that the Chinese revolu-
tion 1s a part of the world revolution. Therefore, Chen maintain-
ed that 111n conjunction with the tide of world revolution we shall 
oombine our forces w1th the forces of the world revolution" to 
achieve Chinese national independence. 35 
Formerly Chen had supported the policy of the Kuo Min Tang-
Communist alliance, mentioned above. But in April 1927, he 
32Chen Tu-Hs1u, Chun Kuo Kuo Min Ko MinS Yu Shah Hu1 Ko ~ (The Chinese Revol'UtronanCI-thevarlous Classesor-cElnes-e.;..;.;;;,. ....... • 
~1.ID, p. 41 •• cited In Sohwartz, IbId., p. 65. -
33Ibid. , 
-
3~hen TU-Hsiu, "Tu Chen Chi Shen" (nThe Voice of Readers"), 
• .a~~ £h2! Pao (Weeklv Gllide), No. 160 (June 30, 1926), cited 




deelar$d: "It would be a mistake to consider the Kuo Min Tang as a 
revolutionary Party" and "i1; is only a bloc of leaders," and "we 
have be£ore us the task of beginning to build a real revolutionary 
government. "36 
Li Ta-Chao: Li Ta-Chao (1889-1921), the co-founder of the 
Chinese Communist Party, was as much attracted by Lenin's revolu-
tion as was Chen Tn-Hsiu. In an article dated October 1918 he 
conceived the victory of Bolshevism as the foundation of the 
Chinese Revolution. "The.real victory is not the victory of allie 
against Germans, but the victory of BolSheviks • • • • Hence-
forth all national boundaries, all dIfferences of classes, all 
barriers to freedom w111 be swept away • • • • The Russian 
Revolution has shaken off the last dismal autumn leaves from the 
tree of world • • • • Thus, the victory of Bolshevism is the 
Yictory of the sp1rit of all mankind."31 
1i fO't.ln4ed the Ma-Ko-Sau-Chu-I Yen"'Ch1u-Hui (The Society for 
the study of Marxism) at Peking University in 1918. Its members 
.. re made up primarily of students. L1 also was the editor ot 
RI1n Chao (New Tide) and co-editor of Chents New Youth. Both 
- -- -.-....-....... 
per10dicals carried L1's man_ articles advocating Bolshevism as 
-~ 36Cited in Leon Trostsky, Problem of the Chinese Revolution, 
woan •• Max Shachtman, (New York, 1932), p. -rJ. . 
loa,. 
101 37Li Ta-Chao, "Bolshevik Ti Shen-1i ft ("The Victory of 
.hevism") Rein ChinS Nien, V, No.5 (1918), pp. 443-447., 
_ted in Schwartz, Chinese Communism and the Rise of l1ao, p. 14. 
------- ~----~--~ ~ ~ --~ 
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the instrument to reseue China :f"rom imperialist oppression. 
Aocording to Li, the proletariat and the peasantry should be made 
consoious of the national independence and aware of the evils of 
oapitalists and imperialists in China. 1J!ost of the foreigners 
were accused by Li of being imperialists. 
In 1926 and 1927 Li opposed the Communist collaboration with 
the Kuo Min Tang on the ground that "there is contusion of thought 
1n the Kuo Min Tang and its principles are extremely unolear re-
garding the Chinese revo1ution."38 During the earlier period of 
the Chinese revolution Lt.s influence on the student circles was 
DO less than that of Chen Tu-Halu. 
Li Li-San: After Chen Tu-Halu was removed from the position 
of general secretary of his party in August 7. 1927, the leader 
actually fell to Li Li-San, though the general secretary of the 
Party was Chu Chtiu Pal. Lits doctrine prevailed from the end of 
1927 until he was reprimanded and exiled by the Party to Moscow 
1n January 1931. Li stubbornly bent his efforts to organize the 
working class in the cities. In November 1928 under his leader-
.hip a part" cir~u1ar insisted that without the proletariat in the 
eity, there could be little prospect of victory in the rural area. 
ter, he felt that the time was ripe for general armed revolt in 
cities. The oity, he maintained, is the oenter of :f"oreign 
38 4 ~loted in 3chwartz, ibid., p. 1. 
-
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imperialism and capitalism, the main supports ot the reactionary 
camp. 39 
Originally, Li and most of Chinese Communists falt that 
American financial imperialism was quite willing to countenance 
a program of sham reform in China on the part ot its bourgeois 
puppets. But the Comintern ot Moscow retused to allow the Chinese 
Communist Party to differentiate between the American and other 
torms ot "imperialism." A letter trom Executive Committee ot 
communist International to the Chinese Communist Party dated 
February 9, 1929, censured this whole line ot reasoning: "The 
American policy toward China like that of British and Japanese is 
an imperialistic policy. The difference lies only in the methods 
ot application. The American 'open door' policy is not designed 
to remove China trom a colonial status. It is a liberal hypocrisy 
meant to prettify imperialist aggression."40 
In a contession ot past errors which appeared in party-
circular ot April 1929, the leadership stated: "We must encourage 
39Robert S. Elegant, China's Red Masters, (New York, 1951), 
f. 209; "Mu-Chfien Cheng-Ch1h Hsing-Shih Yu Chlu-Chung Kung-Tso" "Present Political Conditions and Mass Activities"), p_ 42., cite 
in Schwartz, Chinese Communism and the Rise of Mao, p. 129. ";;"';;';.;;..;.0.,;,0;.;= _______ ............... __
4o"Kun-Chlen Kuo-Chi Chi-Rain Wei-Yun-Hui Yu Chung-Kuo-Kun-
Ohien Tang Shuif ("Letters ot Executive Committee ot Communist 




the masses to oppose imperialism, particularly American imperialis 
for while the masses can rather easily grasp the evils of Japanese 
and British imperialism, the crafty policy of the United states 
might easily lead the masses astray, particularly since they have 
been subject to the bourgeois reformist deception. We must there-
fore stress the aggressive poliCies of the United states which 
wishes, as it were, to suck the marrow of our bones and which is a 
hundred times worse than Great Britain or Japan. ff41 
Of course Li, as the other Communists, insisted that "the 
victory of our revolution must fix irrevocably the victory of the 
world-wide revolution. tt42 However Li could not hold his leader-
ship permanently because he lost the struggle for political power 
within the Party. During the last twenty years leadership fell 
into the hands of Mao Tse-Tung. 
Mao Tse-Tung: Mao.s main policy was mobilizing the poor pea-
sants. Mao in 1926 stated that in semi-colonial China the landlor 
, 
and compradors have been the vassals of the international bourge-
oisie, depending upon foreign imperialism for their existence and 
development. 43 The poor peasants, who constitute 10 per cent of 
4l"J:I'an-Chun-Fa Chan-Cheng-Chung Ti Kun-Tsou Fang-Chin" ("Our 
Policy on Activities against the Wars among the Militaristsff),quot 
8d in Schwartz, Chinese Communism and the Rise of Mao, pp.13l-l32. ____ -N_ _~~~__ ~ ~~ __ ___ 
42Elegant, p. 210. 
43Mao Tse-Tung, "Analysis of the Classes in Chinese Soviety" ~ .... ~954itten in March, 1926), Selected Works of ~ Tse-Tung (London, 
, ), (PP. 13-20) I, 13. 
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the Chinese rural popu1ation,44 have been exploited and oppressed 
by the imperialist elements for years. Therefore, tithe leadership 
of the poor peasants i8 absolutely necessary-til "without the poor 
peasants thel"e can be no l"evolution.,,45 
Accol"ding to Mao, the middle cl&as---Itnational bourgeoisie tt .. -. 
would not favol" the Chinese revolution.46 A certain group among 
the petty bourgeolaie---n students, school teachers, lower govern-
ment .functionaries, office clerks, and petty traders"---, who had 
been economically self-supporting and victimized by the oppression 
and exploitation ot the imperialists, began to real1ze the foreign 
era as ttroreign deVils. u47 But this group, Mao believed, have 
telt uncertain or the suceess of the movement against the imperial. 
lsts and have refused to join the reVolution because the :foreigner~ 
have had so much power behind them.4B However, Mao continued, 
when the revolutionary upsurge could arise and the dawn of victory 
would be discernible, the small group and even the rest of the 
petty bourgeoisie would come to jo1n the ant1~1mperialist revolu-
tlon. 
~ao. "Report of an Investigation into Peasant Movement in 
Hunan" (written in March, 1927), ibid.,(pp. 21 .... 59), 31. 
-
45Ibld., 32. 
46Mao , "Analysis of the Classes 1n Chinese Soc1ety," ~., 14. 
47!2.tc!., 15, 16. 
~: ___ 4_8.I_bi_d~.~'~l~6~. ____________________________________ ~ 
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Mao also regarded the proletariat---"industrial workers"---as 
an important force in the revolutionary movement. The industrial 
workers were able to fight foreign imperialists because they had 
been subjected to the most ruthless treatment by the capitalists 
and imperialists.49 Nevertheless, the proletariat in China, 
according to Mao's estimation, only numbered two million at that 
time.50 For the earlier period of the revolution, the proletariat 
could not carry the heavy burden of military task. 1~e main force 
of the Chinese revolution must come from peasants, particularly 
poor peasants. This idea had been repeatedly insisted on by Mao 
Tse-Tung in his later reports. 
Concerning the peasants, Mao's tactic was that the Communists 
must expand political agitation among the peasants. The Commu-
nists should utilize every opportunity to enrich the content and 
clarify the meaning of these slogans---"Down with the Imperialists~ 
"Down with the local bulies and bad gentry," "Freedom," 
"Equality," and "Unequal treaties'" These slogans, as Mao saw 
them, would be more useful than "ten thousand schools of law and 
49Ibid., 19. 
-
· 50Ibid• Mao did not indicate whether the term "proletariat" 
lnclude~l worker or only factory workers. In comparison with 
other estimations which were made in the early period of the 
.public China it seems that Mao defined the proletariat as 
tactory workers. For the details of the number of workers see 
! W. Woodhead, ed., Ie! China ~ Book, 1931, (Shanghai, 1931), 
~Ol-502. -
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politioal scienoe" for the peasant mI1Ita.nce. 51 To show his 
theory correct Mao reported what he saw: "These political slogans 
are flying about eVerywhere, entering into the head.s ot adults, 
youngsters, old men, children and women in oountless villages • • 
• • If a group of children is at play and if you see one ot them 
get angry at another, you will instantly hear the shrill cry, 
"Down with Imperialism,u52 
In 1928 Mao changed his ideas somewhat. He called on the 
communist members to pay a balanced attention to the rural peasan-
try and the urban proletariat and petty bourgeoisie. For the 
industrial workers employed in the foreign factories the Communist 
must widely propagate the slogan ot "all factories to the workers. 
For the urban bourgeois the Communists must carry out the policy 
ot "turning them 1nto proletarians and then forcing them into the 
revolution." He particularly warned that an "ultra-Left" ?011cy 
ot attacking the petty bourgeois would drive most ot them to the 
11de of imperialist-warlord camp.53 
In early 1930 Mao made an analys1s of the revolutionary 
phenomenon in China based on the "Political Resolution of Sixth 
51Mao , UReport ot an Investigation into the Peasant Movement 
In Hunan;' Selected Worka .£! !!!2. Tee-Tung, I, 49, 50. 
52~., p. 50. 
5311&0, "Why Can China's Red Political Power Exist?tt (written 
l 006~ober 1928), Selected Norks of Mao Tse-~, (pp. 63-70), I, t ,+,65. ... - - -
---
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National Congress of the CCp" of September 1928.54 He stated that 
all imperialist countries ha.ve oontended for China; as the 
imperialists' contention for China intensifies, both the oontra-
diction between the imperialist powers and the Whole Chinese 
nation and the contradiction among the imperialists themselves 
develop simultaneously in China, a daily intensifying strife thus 
will ensue among the various oliques of the "reactionary rulers" 
who have been supported by the imperialist powers. Under this 
phenomenon of contradictions the Chinese Communists should arouse 
the largest numbers of the masses in the shortest possible time. 
At the same time the students and the workers in the oities must 
be stimulated to widen strikes and demonstrations against imperial 
ists. The Red Army heneeforth would be expanded, and the revolu-
tionary upsurge would arise very soon.55 
other Theorists ~ China 
Important to the Chinese Communist theory on anti-imperialism 
are the opinions of the leaders of Moscow. For convenience we 
aummarize with selected words of Trotsky an stalin in the follow-
ing paragraphs. 
54The text of tlpolitioal Resolution of the Sixth National ~ngreSB of the CO lpl" (September 1928) is quoted hwartz, ! 
CUtnentar Histori.2! Chinese Connnunism, pp. ~ lSJ'9:;JW€,,~ 
55Mao, ttA Single Spark Can Start a Pr Me FimtPo(.-rit~ in 
~uary 1930), Selected Works of Mao Tse- , (pPllv~M\28), , 
c;.v-l2l. --
--
Trootsky: T~otsky in 1927 stated that "China is an oppressed 
semi-colonial country. 'The development 01: the productive 1:orce8 
of China ••• demands the shaking o1:r at the imperialist yoke_ n56 
In another work of the same year Trotsky insisted: " Imperialiam, 
which Violently haapers the economic development of China by its 
customs, its financial and military policy, condemns the workers 
to beggary and the peasants to the cruelest enslavement." The 
proessure of foreign-imperialism, as Trotsky regaroded it, is in no 
sense an external and meChanical pressure which welds all the 
classes together. Thus he states, "The Chinese commercial and 
industrial bourgeoisie carries behind it the supplementary foroce 
of foreIgn capital and foreign bayonets in everoy one of its serioul 
collisions with the proletariat. rt57 Therefore. he went on, flif 
one wants to drive out foreign-imperialism ••• then his [the 
1mperlnltst's] ;.>eacetul, normal hangman's and robber's work in 
China must be rendered impossible." The Victory over foreign-
imperiAlism" can only be won by the means of the toilers of town 
land country driving It out of ChIna. n58 Since Chiang Kai ... 3hek's 
lUo Min Tang at that time had begun to discover the Communist 
~on8piracy, it had been regarded by Trotsky as "an instrument ot 
56T~otsky. p. 26. 
57Ibid., p. 116. 
58Ibid 117 _a, p. • 
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compradors and imperialism," "the center of conspiracy,ft and fta 
dictatorship of the bourgeois counter-revolution. n59 
Stalin: Chinese intellectuals found the words of Stalin on 
the Chinese question more attractive than those of Trotsky. 
On November 24, 1918. 3tali~ stated: "The foreign imperialist 
look upon the Orient as the source of their fortune because there 
i8 natural wealth • • • • The imperialists not only want the 
natural wealth, but also want the honest people of the colony and 
semi-colony ••• who would be exploited by the imperialists to 
tight against themselves within their own nation. n60 
In his report made betore the Fourteenth Plenun of the Party, 
December 18, 1925, stalin asserted that the Chinese Revolution is 
tor truth and justice; it is aimed at the emancipation 01' the 
Chinese people trom the imperialists and at the unity of China. 
Anyone who overlooks the oharacter of Chinese Revolution will 
arrive at failure.61 
On Uovember 30, 19?6, he asserted: "The foreign-imperialist 
power in China is not only political but also economical. The 
Chinese railways, mines, factories, and banks all are under the 
59~., pp. 28, 36, 45. 
60JOsePh stalin, Lan C~~g Kuo Ko Min, win~ Ti (on the ~.stions of Chinese Revolu on);-irans. s no-RusSTan:Friendship 
.llociation; (p.king,~949), pp. 36-37. 
~ __ 6_l_Ib_i_d_._'_P_._L_~ ___ 4_2. ________________________________ ~ 
---
foreign-imperialist control. n62 
While he instructed the CCP to build up the Red Army he 
opposed the Communist withdrawal from the Kuo Min Tang,63 because 
he realized it would be impossible to control Chiang Kai-Shek 
directly. In a speech of April 5, 1927 he said "At the present 
time we need the'Right" (the ftRight" Kuo Min Tang).64 However a 
short period later, he sharply criticized Chiang and insisted that 
the COP must withdraw from the Right. He realized there was 
danger for the CCP in the coalition government since Chiangts 
hostility against the CCP was becoming fiercer. 
In his speech of November 30, 1926, we find Stalin ir!sisting 
that city riots must be the first phase ot the efforts to destroy 
foreign imperialists in China, while to arm peasants must be the 
•• cond. 65 But on May 13, 1927, in addressing Chinese students in 
Moscow 3talln err.?hasized that it was time to teach the poor peasan If 
and to arm them, so that t~ey might be an important part of the 
liberation of China from imperialism. 66 
The effect of the above statements of the Communists on the 
62Ibid., p. 45. 
63Ibid., pp. 53, 54, 58. 
64I98.aO, p. 185. 
65stalin, p. 69. 
66Ibid., pp. 119, 121. ~------------
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Chinese intellectual circles, can be seen in the statement of a 
Chinese author, ~oae words read: "Bolshevism in China • • • may 
defy the predatoriness of foreign-imperialism • • • • This is the 
kind of Bolshevism that appeals to the most sensitized and the 
most articulate elements of the nation, the nationalists and the 
intelligentsia. "67 
Attacks ~ Foreisners under Communist Influence 
General Attack. During the early period of the Revolution 
Chen Tu-Hsiu was the head.of the Literature Department of the 
University of Peking, and Li Ta-Chao professor of history at the 
same university. Because of their intellectual eminence Chen and 
Li had great influence on the students in the educational oenters. 
Religion being the opium.of the people, according to Marxism-
Leninism, the "foreign religion" became the first target of the 
attackers. In fact, during the early period of the Republio the 
conservative idea was as strong as before. The general attitude 
was that China had its own superior moral teachings of Confucius 
and did not need the ~heretic" religion from the west. 68 This 
general attitude made easy the Communist movement against the 
Church. The slogans for anti-religion at tho beginning were 
-
61Ken Shah-Wei, Russo-Chinese Diplomacl, (Shanghai, 1928), 
P. 325. 
68Kiang 'Nen-Han, p. 53. 
~~------------------------,-----
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ItHeligious faith is anti-knowledgen or "religion is the opiate of 
people,1t A proolamation sent out by the Anti-Christian Student 
Federation in Maroh, 1922 read: "Christianity and the Christian 
Churoh have oreated many evils in the history of mankind • • • • 
The present Christianity and Church are the evils that support the 
property-holding class to exploit and oppress the non-property 
holding cla8s."69 But such attacks, however, as Chapman said, 
had less effect than attacks which said that Christianity was a 
"foreign religion," managed and subsidized by foreigners, an 
imperialistic system elaborately organized with its literature, 
its churohes, sohools, and hospitals, tor the purpose of dominat-
ing and enslaving the Chinese people.70 The missionaries, ot 
course, were reviled as "spies of imperialistslf and "oapitalist 
torces n and accused 01' catching the young lite of Chins. for their 
own imperialistic purposeJ the Chinese Christians were accused as 
"the running dogs of the imperialists,ft or "you submit yourselves 
to the imperialists and capital~sts who are exploiting you. n71 
Hughes, as a witness in China during the early days, saw that the 
Communist propaganda at that time was making advances in stUdent 
-
69Quoted in ibid., p. 62. 
-
70H• Owen Chapman, !h! Chinese Revolution, 1926-1927, (London 
1928), pp. 172-173. 
~:.......' 71Quoted in E. R. Hughes, The Invassion of China ~ the -!stern World, (London, 1937), PP7 95, 192. -- ---" 
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circles in the North and was destined soon to be legitimized in 
the South; the intelligentsia were entirely conversant with 
c~~unist agitations. 72 Other early experts on China witnessed 
the same thing. 73 
There was another prevalent feeling regarding the foreigners. 
A Chinese student, in the Weekly Revie~ of November 1, 1924, made 
a declaration: "The prevalent feeling in China has been that 
foreigners as such are superior to the Chinese; it is this feel 
which sets China to be a pupil of the Nest. The result is 
material improvement, but spiritual degeneration. Man in China 
begins to lose his self-respect, becomes a mere imitator. n74 The 
ltudent went on that the Chinese must attack those foreigners who 
had a " superior air" and niooked down upon all Chinese. n'7!) 
Plychologically speaking, self-belittling plays a role of resent-
•• nt. Since the foreign missionaries made up a large percentage 
ot the westerners in China, Chinese resentment became fixed on 
72 5 Ibid., p. 9 • 
-
73a. H. Gowen and J. W. Hall, An ~lt1ine History of China, 
(lew York, 1926), p. 422; Chapman, pp. 73, 171-173; Macartney 
and others, Survey of International Affairs, for ~, II (London, 
1928), 320, 322; Arnold J. Toynbee, surve~ of-r:nternational 
Affairs, ~ 1926, (London, 1928), 283-28 .--
74Quoted in Gowen and Hall, pp. 422-423. 
75Ibld., p. 423. 
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the missionaries as a consequence. The resentment burst out into 
violent riots against missionaries. 
Outrage against Christianity. History shows that the flame 
of vilblent riots against Christianity came to peak intensity from 
1924 to 1927. A few cases will be illustrative. 
In May 1924 some American priests were arrested, and two 
other missionaries were killed at Kweilin. 76 In December a group 
of Catholic priests and nuns were captured near Hankow. 71 In May 
1925, two missionaries were captured at Linchow. 78 In February 
1926 an American mission at Kashek, on the Island of Hainan, was 
destroyed by students and soldiers. 79 In the same place, a Frencll 
orphanage was similarly attacked a year later.80 In March 1926, 
the Canton Hospital, an American philanthropic institut4on, was 
compelled to close, because the Communist Worker's Union caused 
the Chinese staff to seize control of the orphanage by cutting off 
water, electricity, and tood supplies. 81 The same thing happened 
to the Canton Christian College and the Anglo-Chinese College at 
76The New York Times, May 2, 1924, p. 26., May 27, 1924, p. 6 
---
71~.~ n6cember 8, 1924, p. 1. 
78Ibid., May 3. 1925, p. 28., May 7, 1925, p. 9. 
-
19TOynbee, pp. 338-339-
80The Times (London), Be~ary 18, 1927, p. 14. 
--~. I 81~., March 11, 1926, p. 11; March 15, 1926, p. 13 • 
.. L.... _________ ----
swatow. 82 At ~Vuchow, the Amerioan mission station and schools 
were closed and the missionaries were expelled because the Chinese 
did not want the white people to "degrade" the young Chinese. 83 
At Chengtu a Canadian woman missionary was murdered in the street 
on the seventh of June. 84 There was anti-Christian riot at 
Nanchowting in Hunan, in which the property of the mission was 
damaged. 8S At Changsha, there was a riot against the America 
Mission College; the student Union under Communist agitation 
demanded the control of the administration from American hands. 86 
In January, 1927, an outrage against the Spanish mission at Fuchow 
occurred. The story was spread that the mission orphanage was 
maintained to procure children whose eyes and other organs would 
be removed to make drugs. The agitators throughout several pro-
vinces were using tales of this kind to excite the populace 
against foreign missionaries. 87 On April 1, 1927, three mis&ons 
were looted at Kweillng, and widespread anti.Christian riots 
82Ibid., March 19, 19?6, p. 131 March 29, 1926, p. 14. 
83~., April 6, 1926, p. 10. 
84Ib1d., June 22, 1926, pr 16, June 28, 1926, p. 14. 
85Ibid., November 22, 1926, p. 14. 
86The New York Times, December 17, 1926, p. 7; The Times 
(Londonr;-January i9, 1~~7, p. 13. ---
192 87The !!! 12!! Times, January 18, 1927, p. 4, January 20, 7, p:J • 
..... 
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happened in Chunking. 88 Two days later two churches and the Mahan 
school were seized by students and soldiers at Shanghai.89 
Concerning the systematic violent attacka on foreign mission-
aries some~ritish observers in December 1926 reported that 
communist agents were furiously trying to bolshevize the Chinese 
people and to promote the Chinese nationalist sentiment against 
foreigners by gDoss misrepresentation.90 
Also, an American ofticial, atter three months in China, 
reported in July 1927 that in the previous years attacks against 
missionaries and foreigners were due to Red intluence.91 
Riots as.inst Foreigb Factories ~ Concessions. As we know 
labor problems have provided stimulation to the Co~nunist movement 
The Chinese laborers, as the other Chinese people, had the tradi-
tional anti-toreign attitude, and also as the Communlts stated, 
they realized that they were under the oppression of foreign-
imperialists and capitalists because ot their direct contact with 
the foreigners. 92 After the First Congress of CCP on July 1, 1921 
labor unions were organized by the Communist leaders in many 
88Ib1d., April 1, 1927, p. 1. 
89Ibid., April,), 1927, p. 3. 
-90~., December 17, 1926, p. 7. 
91~., July). 1927, Section 1, p. 6. 
S4 92Hu Bua, Chung Kuo Hain Min Chu Chu I Ko MinS Shih, pp. 29. 
<, J also see tootnote~.- - - - - - -
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cities. 93 In tl~ Second Congress of' the CCP, July 1922, a deci-
sion to exploit laborers in the right against foreign-imperialism 
was put on record. 94 
On the other hand, the concessions. which allowed foreigners 
to have their own troops, post offices and courts in the extra-
territories, were considered as a great humiliation to the Chines 
people. Communist policy decided that the masses must attack the 
foreign extraterritories without previous diplomatic negotiation. 
Thereupon a tlNew Boxerts Spirit" arose stronger than the spirit 
whieh prompted the riot of 1900. 
The year 1922 brought the strike of Chinese seamen in Hong 
Kong. ~~is lasted two months. The men asked tor a large incr 
in their scale of wages, but it was soon observed that agitators" 
aoting for political motives, were back ~f it.95 This strike has 
been called the first vie tory for Chinese labor on the part of 
Chinese Communists.96 The year 1923 saw .fifty-one labor disputes 
in Shanghai, but they were Rot so serious as the strike of the 
previous year. For some reason the activities of Bolsheviks and 
their agitators had been less vigorous during 1923.97 Fram July 
-
93Hu Hua, pp. 27, 29. 
94;Cbid., p. 41. 
95Macartney and others, II, 318-320. 
96Hu Hua, pp. 29-31. 
91M 
and others • 
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15 to August 19, 1921 ... in Oanton a general strike took place, the 
basis o£ wnich was clearly political. On June 19, 1924, a bombing 
attempt was made in the British concession at Oanton against the 
governor o£ French Indo-Ohina, and there were numerous European 
casualities. The authorities ot the concession theretore insti-
tuted regulations tor the control ot the Ohinese in the concession 
These regulations were resented by the Chinese, and a general and 
violent strike ensued led by Communist agitators.98 
In 1925, the so called "WU San Tsen An" or the "Incident of 
30th ot May" oocurred. Originally forty Chinese employees of a 
Japanese mill at Shanghai we~e dismissed on February 4, 1925. As 
a consequence 313,000 Chinese workers were made idle. Machinery 
was destroyed, the manager was killed, and some other Japanese 
employers wounded. on May 14 because two Ohinese foremen in a 
Japanese factory were dismissed again, the Chinese workers destroy 
ed machinery again, and some Chinese were wounded by Japanese fire 
About five thousand students paraded the main streets of the Inter 
national Settlement, distributing anti.imperialist pamphlets and 
-&king speeches. The students called tor united action against 
the capitalist and imperialist states of France, America, Great 
Brltaih, and Jap~n. In the following tew days there were 
-
I 98Ibid., 321; also The Times (London),July 17, 1924, p. 13; 
~ Ul1 23~2~, p. 13; Jury-)l, lQz4. p. 11. 
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continuous outbreaks and attacks on foreigners. 99 This general 
riot was led by Li Li-San, the Communist Chairman of All Labor 
Federation, and another Communist, Liu Rua. lOO Moscow revealed 
that the Comintern aided the general outUreak with 30,000 rubles!O 
Not only the Chinese Communists admitted tta t they had incited 
this disturbance; at the same time foreign reporters at the scene 
saw much evidences of the Communist agitation. An interesting 
feature of the trial of the students arrested in connection with 
the riot was the production by the prosecution of a mass of 
Bolshevist literature discovered in many college8. l02 
Another milestone in the history of Chinese Communist agita-
tion against toreigners is the attack on the British concession at 
Hankow on January 3, 1927. This attack was led by Liu Shao-Chi, 
the discipliner of the CCP, and former vice-president of Red 
Government ot Peking. Since the Chinese people at that time 
resented the British who had tired upon the Chinese on the 
oooasion of the Communist celebration ot their anti-imperialist 
99Marcartney and others, 381-382. 
100Hu Hua, pp. 62, 63. 
101 !h! ~ ~ Times, June 4, 1925, p. 12. 
102The Times (London), June 10, 1925, p. 14; for further 
'Yldence~ show the Communist agitation in the riot of 30th May 
'" ~bi~., June 1, p. 10; June 2; p. 12; June 3, p. 12; June 4, 
• 1,; une 6, p. 12; June 8, p. 14. 
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Labor Union,lO) the police could not control the mm. The mob 
swarmed into the British concession. The foreign residents of the 
concession were chased. A Westerner walking in the street was no 
longer safe from stone throwing. The yell of the mob was "Kill 
the foreign dog.l ff And on January 6, the British flag was hauled 
down. 104 Comment in the New York Times stated that the seeds of __ ........ ;",;0.;;. ... 
hate sown two years before by the Communist agents had grown 
copiously. 105 
The American consulate at Chunking was subjected to a similar 
catastrophe. On March 31 of the same year, the American Consulate 
was stoned and the consul was forced to flee to a warship. The 
American flag was also torn down. The accusation was "Amerlcan-
Britain imperialist cooperation against China. nl06 The Communist 
operation behind the scene was evident as interpreted by the 
American reporters.107 
All these outrages against foreigners cited above were hailed 
in August 1927, by the Chinese Communist Party as rtthe glorious 
10)Hu Hua, pp. 84, 85. 
~j l04The New .!.2!:! Times, January Ij., 1927, p. 27; January 5, 
~927, P.-rj 3anuary 6, 1927, p. 1. 
l05~., editorial, January 5, 1927, p. 20. 
lo6~., April 1, 1927, p. 1. 
l07~., April 16, 1927, p. 2; April 17, 1927, P. 9. 
~-------------' 
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page of history of the Chinese Communist movement. tl108 
In viewing the description given in this chapter, we might 
conclude that during the beginning of the Chinese revolution 
Communism was concordant with the Chinese new nationalist spirit, 
and that the various attacks operated by the Co~~nlsts were 
rather the outlet for this spirit. But 8. revolutionary chaos 
always provides the opportunity for the development of Communism, 
particularly so in anti-foreign China. 
l08nCircular Letter ot the CC rOOp] to All Party Members" 
(August 7, 1921), cited in Schwartz, ! Documentar,l History 2!. 
Chinese Communism, p. 103. 
~---------
CHAPTER III 
"UNI'rED FRONT" AGAINST .JAPAN 
(1931-1945) 
The traditionally ethnocentric attitude of the Chinese toward 
the Japanese has been mentione4 in the first chapter. Now some 
interpretation must be added here. The Chinese call the Japanese 
"small Japanese." A Chinese designated by the nickname, "small 
Japanese," would deeply resent it. A Chinese who has a round face 
and short body.would have his countrymen say,"Re looks like a 
Japanese I " If a Chinese girl has bowed legs the young boys might 
say that no one would want to marry her because her legs are like 
those of a Japanese woman. 
Schools have helped to foster hatred of the Japanese, since 
students are taught the history of Japanese aggression against 
China. "The small Japanese have forgotten their ancestors, their 
• parents," is not merely a saying used by the common people, but is 
to'be heard in speeches made by offiCials before the public. The 
ohildren in China like to playa Chinese-Japanese battle game: 
one group plays the role of the Japanese; the other, of the ChineSE 
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sticks are their guns and stones are their hand-grenades. Such 
games are in vogue even among college studBnts. 1 
The peasants in the rural areas did not know ot British, 
French, and American "imperialism" until they were taught about it 
by the Chinese Communists. However, the term "Japanese imperial ... 
iam" was well known to them. The peasants did not, and still do 
not, like to 11se the ri::~ht appe11ation---Japanese; inste9.d of this 
"Japanese devil," or "devil" is customarily used. ,~hen the 
Communists moved into the country and began to prepare the unedu-
cated peasantry to fight the Japanese, they found a hatred of the 
Japanese already established. 
~ Sino-Japanese Conflicts after !2J! 
The Chinese people, still remembering Japanese hostilities 
against China in the past, were subjected again to agp~ession in 
summer of 1931. On July 2, 1931, as the result of a dispute 
between Chinese and Korean farmers in Wanpaoshan, Kilin Province, 
12" Chinese inhabi tants were killed and 393 Chinese were woUnded 
by Japanese and Koreans in Seoul, Korea. 2 Following this incident 
the Japanese began an invasion of Manchuria on September 18, 1931. 
IFor college students playing the battle game in early days 
see Agnes Smedly, Battle ~ of China, (New York, 1943), p. 109. 
2Arnold J. To~bee, Survey of International Affairs, for 1931 
(London. 1932), p. 434. . - --
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In the following few months Japan sent her troops deep into 
Manohuria and bombarded many cities. On February 16, 1932, a 
puppet regime of Manohuria was set up, and on January 28 and 29, 
1932, Japanese forces attacked the Chapei district of Shanghai. 
Japanese warShips bombarded Nanking on the 2nd of February, and 
the Chinese Government was forced to withdraw to Loyang, Honan 
Province. On January 3, 1933, Japanese forces bombarded and 
occupied 3hanhaikwan. Ignoring the League Committee of Nineteen, 
which had met for discussion of the Sino-Japanese conflict, 
Japanese troops advanoed into Jehol Province on the 24th of 
February, and by Maroh 5th; launohed an invasion across the Great 
Liall,: ,1n inner M01Jlgolia.' By March 30th, Japanese troops entered 
Chahar Province. During April and May they rushed on south of the 
Great Wall and occupied the Luan River district and threatened 
Peiping and Tientsin. On May 31st, the Chinese Government was 
forced to sign the Tangku Agreement, by which Chinese troops 
evacuated Tangku, and Chinese Government promised to cease hosti-
Ii ties against Japan.; On November 15, 1935. the Japanese made an 
attempt to enlarge the "autonomous" puppet state of Yin Ju-Keng in 
the eastern part of Hopei Province. In December they conducted 
air and army campaigns to force the Chinese Government to recogniz 
3The Tangku Agreement is re.ferred to by Westel W. Wi 1 loyghby, 
~ Sino-Japanese Controversy ~ ~ ~eagu6 £! Nation!. (Balti-
more, 1935). pp. 501-~08. . 
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the "Autonomy of North China," and. on December 15th, the ItAutono-
mous Political Council for HopEli and Chahar" was formally 
inaugurated. On January 18, 1936, Japanese again set up an "Auto-
nomy of Inner Mongolia," which was allied to the Manchuria Puppet 
state. From January to Nobember of the same year the Japanese 
with their puppet troops made sporadic attacks in North China. 
The anti-Japanese movement gained great momentum. in China as a 
consequence. 
Anti-Japan~ !!?vement 
When the news of the WaI}paoshan and Mukden incidents reached 
Shanghai, the Chinese Chamber of Commerce at Shanghai decided to 
lead a nation wide anti-Japanese boycott. On November 24, 1931, 
thirty-five thousand workers were called out at the Japanese port 
area in Shanghai. By the beginning of December about 800,000 
workers struck in protest against Japanese aggreasion.4 During 
the same period in Yunnan the anti-Japanese movement forced twenty 
five Japanese residents to leave. On OctOber 10, 1931, at Canton 
Chinese refused to sell goods to the Japanese ~nd waged a general 
boycott on the loading and unload1r1g of Japanese ships. During 
the same period simultaneous outbreaks of the same character 
happened at Swatow, Amoy, Foochow, Wenchow, Hanchow, Q..nd in North 
IPrhe number of workers is given in Hu Eua, Chung ~ ~ .M!.!! 
~ ~ ! !2. rUng .§h!.h, p. 153. 
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China. FDr example, on September 28, 1931, fifteen Japanese resi-
dents at Chenghow found it advisable to leave. At Tientsin 
violent attacks on Japanese were made on November 8, 1931.5 
During the following years the murder ot Japanese in the cities 
became quite common. 6 
It is difficult to determine what role the Communists played 
in thoae outbreaks. However, Mao Tse-Tung has asserted that the 
Communists supported any anti-Japanese movement, particularly, 
aiding the Shanghai boycott with a great deal ot money.1 
communist writers boasted that many cases of anti-Japanese out-
breaks were promoted and led by CoMmunists. 8 
The Chinese stUdents also plunged into aetion to demand a 
united tront against Japan. On September 28, 1931, a host of 
.tudents stormed the Ministry ot Foreign Affairs at Nanking ana 
1nflicted physioal ~njuries upon the Foreign Minister C. T. Wang 
on account ot his lack ot success in his negotiations with the 
5fhe summary o~ the anti-Japanese movement in various cities 
18 referred to Toynbee, Survez of International Affairs, ~ ~, 
PP. 4.63-465. -
6For details of murder eases see ibid., PP. 468-470; also Ired., for 1932, p. 514: also ibid., for-I936, PP. 2oi, 911, 917. 
, 920-921. ----
7Mao Tse-Tung, "Report ot the President or the Central 
ixecutive Committee of the Chinese Soviet Republic," Yakhontoft, ~2~~nese Soviets, (New York, 1934), (Appendices, PP. 249-283), 
8 Hu Hua, p. 1.53 • 
..... 
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League of Nations.9 Late in November, 1931, about fifty thousand 
students, including many from Shanghai and Hangchow, gathered in 
the capital, Nanking, to petition the Government to drive out the 
Japanese. The students refused to withdraw until Chiang Kai-Shek 
addressed them personally.10 On December 9 other bands of stu 
stormed and captured the municipal ottice ot Shanghai, cowed the 
municipal authorities, defied the police and disarmed the officer 
Finally they wrecked the local headquarters of the Kuo Min Tang. 
On December 15, about eighty thousand students from di.ffe1"ent 
cities converged upon llanking and for the second time wrecked the 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs and attacked ;he Central Headquarters 
ot ~uo Min Tang. Several top officials were physioally attacked. 
The students transferred their resentment against Japan to 
their own government primarily becaUse the government tried to 
avoid a m~litary conflict with Japan by appealing to the League 
lations. This governmental policy worked to the advantage of the 
Communists. A Chinese writer at that time stated that Communist 
influence was growing among the students who partioipated in 
Communist demonstrations in large cities) that in at least some 
-
9'l'oynbee, Survey!! International Affairs, !2::.~, p. 414. 
lOKia~ Wen-Han, The 9h1nese Student MOVement, p. 103. 
IlToynbee, Survez 9.! Internatim a1 Affairs, !2£!2.J.!, p. 415. 
12Ib1d• 
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of the student strikes in various cities there was a directing 
hand of the Communist party.1) This writer also pointed out that 
in spite of the Kuo Min Tang.s suppression of Communism. Communis 
literature still was secretly distributed: "One would, for exampl 
come across a book with a cover entitled tpaul, the Friend of 
Youth' publisheg by the 'Christian Literature Siciety, Shanghai, 
1930' sud would be surprised to fInd on the first page that it 
really the Communist International Monthll. Or one would be 
attracted by the title of a popular novel on another book cover 
and find propaganda in the form ot folk song • • • • tl14 
Moreover, the Oommu~ t books and the works ot left-wing 
writers constituted a great percentage of books read during that 
period.15 It is reasonable to say that the students. outbreaks 
were definitely influenced by Communist propaganda. 
On December 9. 1935, students burst out again in protest 
against Japan's forcible demand ot separation ot North China. 
Students trom nearly all colleges and schools in Peiping took 
in the demonstration. 16 Minor clashes. occurred between the polic 
l3wu Yao-Tsung, "Movement Among Chinese Students," China 
~lstlan Yearbook, 12J!, edt Frank Rawlinson, (Shanghai, 1931), 
PP. 259-274), p. 262. 
l4Ibid. 
-15~., p. 265. 
16!h! !!! ~ Times, December 10, 1935, sect. 1, p. 14. 
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and students. A number of students were beaten with clubs or 
wounded by swords of the police while the writer was at the scene. 
Another city wide stUdent demonstration was launohed in Peiping on 
December 16, 1935. About seven thousand students participated in 
the parade. Their slogans were. "Down with Northern Militarists'" 
"Down with Japanese Imperialism'" "China for the Chinese'" The 
police tried to stop them with firehoses and clubs. The students 
cried "Chinese police, do not fight Chinese students'" and 
"Chinese, arise to save Chinal" as the writer heard at that time~ 
Subsequently, a series ot student demonstrations took place in 
Nanking, Tientsin, Shanghai, Kaiteng, Hanko. and other cities.18 
The peiping Student Union worked out a synopsis of its 
program tor the use ot its propaganda teams, revealing something 
ot the Communist role in the student demonstrations. The synopsis 
asserted that China, being a semi-colonial and semi-feudal country 
could only have a future by struggling against imperialiSM and 
teudaliSM, but that just then the paramount task was to deteat 
Japanese imperialism; that the policy ot appeasement ot the Kuo 
Min Tang was causing more conoeBn than the invasion ot the enemy, 
-
l7Ibid., Dec·ember 11, 1935. Sect. 1, p. 18., for details see 
Hubert F'reyn, .;:,.P-;;.,re;;,;;l;;,;;u;;.;;d;,,;;.e !.2.Y!!!:,,, (Shanghai, 1939)" Chapter III. 
l8The New York Times, December 18, 1935, sect. 1, p. 1. Deoember-r9;-r9~seot. 1, p. 16; December 20, 1935, sect. 1, 
~ ..... !. 11, December 21, 1935, sect. 1, p. 1. December 22, 1935, 
..• ~.ct. 1, p. 21, December 24, 1935, sect. 1. p. 9. 
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and hence there should be a united opposition against civil war; 
that China could not be isolqted from the rest of world; and that 
the Chinese problem was only a part of the world problem, so that 
China must join hands with the other oppressed races and nations 
in a common struggle} and that for national emancipation the 
students could not do the fighting alone but must promote a "unitee 
front" with the masses of the people.19 
This synopsis led the Nanking Government to condemn the 
Communist influence behind the student movement. 20 An expert on 
the Chinese Communist movement said that Communists took advantage 
of the stUdent "patriotic" demonstrations and that many of the 
leading demonstrators later became COlmnunist officials. 21 An ex· 
Communist who had worked with the Chinese Communist Party for 
eighteen years indicated that Communists had played an important 
role within the student anti-Japanese movement, and that student 
resentment against Japan was transferred to the Nanking Governmen 
at the Communist Party's instructiona. 22 
On March 28, 1936, a Chinese Student Union was inaugurated at 
Shanghai. It claimed to represent two hundred thousand students 
-
19cited in Kiang Wen.Han, pp. 106-107. 
20The New York Times, December 1"1, 1935. sect. 1, p. 18. 
--_ ....... _ .... 
21Hu Tsiou-Yuan. "Preface" for Szu Ma-Lu, TOW-Chien Shih Pa t1en (Eighteen Years Struggle), (Hong Kong, 1952), pp. j-~.--
22Sz. Ms.-Lu, pp. 17-22. 
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of universities and middle schools. In its "Call to the Nation" 
it said that this organization had aimed to establish a national 
anti-Japanese united front to stnuggle for the existence ot ChinesE 
nation. 23 This was in keeping with the Communist propaganda---
"United Front against Japan,1t which w111 be dealt with later. 
The policy of the Kuo Min Tang toward any foreign country was 
made olear in a declaration issued as early as January 22, 1927, 
by Eugen Chen on behalf of the National Government at WUhan. This 
declaration made it olear that the Kuo Min Tang would not use 
armed conflict with toreign nations, even Japan, to sotve the 
internatIonal problems. It 'InsIsted that all unsolved problems 
between National Revolutionary ChIna and foreign powers should be 
regulated by negotIation and agreement. 24 
Although Japan committed unprecedented aggressions against 
China, ChIang Kai-Shek still endeavored to avoid armed conflict 
with Japan. Chiang tried through the League ot Nations to restrail 
Japanese aggressions, at least temporarily. The opponents of 
Chiang cr1 tic1zed his policy as "non-resistance. tI Actually, Chianl 
23!h! Voice of China, I, No.3 (April 15, 1936), 8, quoted in 
liang Wen-Ran, p.-ro7. 
24The text of the manifesto issued by Chen quoted in Tang ~ L_a_n_g_-_L_l ___ Th_e_Inn_8_r_H_l_s_t_o_r_I_9_.!_t_h_e_C_h_i_n_e_s_8_R_e_v_o_lu_ti_o_n_,_p_il_3_3_6_. __ ... 
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saw that Japan was strong, while China was weak; that defeat would 
be inevitable it China got involved in a large-seale war with 
Japan. Knowing this, the Japane.e then made every effort to find 
a pretext tor immediate war with China, but Chiang Kai-Shek ordere 
Chang Haueh-Liang, the governor ot Manchuria, to retreat trom 
Manehuria without a fight. He also issued an order to Tsai Ting-
Ke, the commander of Nineteenth Rout. A~y, to cease reilstance 
against the Japanese at Shanghai. Before World War II Chiang Kai-
Shek always insisted that China could not right nan unprepared war 
with Japan." China must bide its time. Chiang believed. The 
popular assertion of Chiang Kai-Shek was that "we shall not forsa~ 
peace until there is no hope for peace. We shall not talk lightly 
of .acrifiee until we are driven to the last extremity which makes 
sacririce inevltable. n25 
The Chinese traditional policy was: first, pacification with. 
in the nation, and. then resistance to :foreign aggression. The 
Kuo Min Tang Government believed that the :first task or resistance 
against Japan should be to unify China, sinee there was the exist-
ence of provincialists and the opposition of the Communists. 
~Vhile Chiang Kai-Shek was using persuasive tactics to win control 
of the warlords, he was using the armed forces in five campaigns 
25The statement was made at the Fifth National Congress of tht 
Kuo Min Tang in November, 1935. The English quotation quoted in 
T. A. Bisson, Japan.!!l China. (New York, 1938), p. 93. 
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against Communists between the end ot 1930 to autumn of 1934. 26 
After the fifth campaign the Chinese Communists were forced to 
move through the country, from south to northwest China. 
In the cities, the Kuo Min Tang followed a policy of suppress 
ing the anti-Japanese movement. From 1931 to 1937 the most common 
problem was opposition to the Kuo Min Tangls policy of nOnPesist-
ance to Japanese encroachments. Against the anti-Japanese move~ 
ment the Kuo Min Tangts secret police, or "Blue Shirts,1t were lIept 
busy arresting and killing the demonstrators and the Red agitators 
For instance, in 1931 a collection of reports from only six 
provinces produced a total ot 39, 778 executions. 27 This was the 
"White Terror,tt so called by the Chinese Communists and some 
foreign reporters. 28 
Under the unceasing Japanese pressure the Kuo Min Tang was 
compelled to make its policy clearer than before. On June 10, 
1935, it promulgated a "Goodwill Mandate" which said that uAll 
citizens should observe the proper amenities towards rriendly 
26Accordlng to the Kuo Min Tang there was four campaigns, but 
the Chinese Communists count five. The difference is due to the 
period of June to September, 1931, which the Communists divided 
Into two periods. 
27The figure is given in Isaac, The Tragedz of the Chinese 
~Volutlon, p. 296. According to IsaacTs interpretatIon, thIs 
~lgure Is not very accurate, but not seriously exaggerated. 
~ 11 28Por .. discussion or the "White Terror" aee Smedley, PP" 104 ~_2_1_. __ sm_e_d_l_e_y_ha _ S_b_e_en __ a_s_ym:_p_a_th_i_z_er __ W_l_th __ the __ C_h_in_e_s_e_c_omm_, ll_U_l_s_t_S_ ...... 
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natlons;1I and that "no organizat1ons whatsoever can be formed 
_hleh might be detrimental to intern_tional relations."29 Later, 
on February 19. 1936, an emergency law was issued authoriz1ng the 
troOPS or po11ce to "use force or other effect1ve measures to 
IUPpress all 'patriQtic' meet1ngs and demonstrations."30 However, 
the Kuo Min Tang were not traitors; they made use of the anti-
Japanese tendenoy to inject anti-Japanese spirit and disci~line 
Into the p1ck of the1r arm¥; the teachers in the schools retained 
the materials concerning Japanese aggressive history. But the 
ICuo Min Tang felt that the people had to be kept quiet in order to 
prevent Communist expl01tation and to deprive the Japanese of a 
pretext for further aggression • 
.'!:h! Communist Appeal !2. Resistance against Japan 
BeCause the Kuo Min Tang did not resist Japanese aggression 
in Manchuria, it left itself open to a psyohological attack by the 
Communists. On April 26, 1932, a telegram of "Declarat1on ~ar 
Against Japan" was issued by the "Soviet Republic of China."31 
The heart of this declaration is as follows: 
p. 58. 29Quoted in Bisson, Japan ~ China, 
30The English translation quoted in 
pp. 65-66. 
Hubert Feryn, Prelude to 
-War, 
-
; 31The text of "Declaration War against Japan" is in Yakhontof 
~ L!h~ Chin ••• Soviets, (Appendioes), pp. 236-238. 
,.. 
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The counter-revolutionary Kuo MIn Tang Government 
and the militarists ot all cliques following their gene-
ral practice ot capitulation to imperiali~. surrendered 
Manchuria, Shanghai, Woosung • • • to Japanese imperial-
ism, leaving unchecked the slaughter ot Chinese people. 
At present, the Kuo Min Tang, under the pretext ot ne-
gotiating tor peace, is selling the whole of China. It 
is exerting the utmost effort to haoten the imperialist 
partition of China. To demonstrate its loyalty to im-
perialism, the Kuo Min Tang with the all means at its 
disposal suppresses the nation wide anti-Japanese • • • 
movement, all anti-Japanese o~ganization} breaks all 
anti-Japanese strikes ot the workers, shoots down the 
anti-Japanese masses • • •• The so-called "prolonged 
resistance," the so-called "negotiate peace while offer-
ing resistance" ot the Kuo Min Tang ••• ar& in ~eality 
nothlng but phrases concocted to tool the masses. J2 
This declaration also insisted that the "government ot the 
Soviet Republic ot China" would unite and lead the workers, pea-
sants, students and other groups, and the Red Army to engage in 
the national "revolutionary war" to q.rive the Japanese out ot Chint 
to oppose the "imperialist pari;ition" of China. However, the first 
step tor driving imperialism out of China, the declaration assert-
ed, must be the overthrow ot the Kuo Min Tang regime. Only in 
this way, as it was pointed out, could the Communists directly and 
unhinderedly fight against the Japanese lmperialists.33 
On April 15, 1933, under the names of Mao Tse-Tung$ Chu Teh, 
and Chang KUo Tao, another declaration was issued • .34 '11}}is mes,9age 
32Ibid., p. 236. 
-
33Ibid., p. 237. 
-
34The text of this declaration originally appeared in China 
Forum (May 4, 1933), quoted in Yakhontoff, (Appendices), pp. 238-
12U. 
is a repetition of the Deolaration of War against Japan. But its 
conolusion emphasized the appeal: tlWe appeal to all toilers and 
soldiers to work tor the aooeptanoe of our national revolutionary 
policy among the broad masses. We appeal to the toiling masses 
and soldiers to help us to defend China and the rights of its 
people. tt35 
On January 22, 1934, Mao Tse-Tung made a comprehensive report 
to his party.36 In this report we find two important aims: to 
urge on the anti-Japanese movement, and to arm and organize the 
peasants and toiling classes. Mao stated that the Kuo Min Tang 
had sold many parts of China to the foreign imperialists and 
suppressed the anti-Japanese masses. So the Soviet district, Mao 
insisted, was the real anti-Japanese imperialist areal the Commu-
nists must continue to creat anti-Japanese volunteers and to 
support the anti-Japanese movement in any part of China. 37 To Mao 
Tse-Tung the Japanese imperialism was not isolated in its aggres-
sion against China. He declared that the fight against "British, 
American, French, and Japanese imperialists" should be made 
35Yakhontoft, p. 241. 
36The report was made before the Second Soviet Congress held 
at Chuchin, a small town ot Kiangsi Province and then the Red 
Capital. The whole text originally appeared in the Chinese 
Worker's corres1ondenoe (an official news agency ot£ne Cap), IV, No. 1;1. (Marcn j • 193~J, quoted in Yakhontofr, (Appendices), 
pP. 249-283. 
37Yakhontoff, pp. 252, 258, 282. 
simultaneously, because he thought that "British, American, and 
French imperialists" intended "to wreck the Chinese Soviet power 
and to completely enslave the Chinese nation as a preliminary step 
toward the war against the U.S.s.R. n 38 
Mao Tse-Tung also instructed his Party: "The historial task 
of the Soviet is: to mobilize broad worker-peasant masses to join 
the Red Army • • • to enlarge the local armed forces and partisans 
to agitate for broad partisan wars • • • to develop the class-
struggle • • • to promote the militanoe of the worker-peasant 
masses. n39 Aocording to Mao, his aims were not only in line with 
Marxist revolutionary theories, but were also made inevltable 
because ot Japanese aggression and the Kuo Min Tang's attack upon 
the Chinese Communists. 
On July 15, 1936, a Communist controlled organization sent 
out a message of appeal to all Chinese people to take united actio 
against Japan.40 Mao Tse-Tung on August 10, 1936, made a public 
and adroitly timed statement. 41 In replying to publio demands tor 
a cessation of civil war and tor immediate action against Japan, 
381bid., p. 251 • 
........... 
391bid., pp. 251, 259 • 
........... 
4OFor the text ot the message of the communist controlled 
organization, All China National Salvation Union, see Mao Tse-Tung 
and others, China: The March Toward un1tl. (New York, 1937), 
PP. 51-59. ---




Mao stated that the Chinese Communists after the events of Septem-
ber 18, 1931, were the first to offer their cooperation in the 
struggle against Japan to all groups throughout the country.42 He 
added that the Communist Party had no grounds whatever for giving 
up their anti-Japanese policy or discontinuing anti-Japanese 
activities.4.3 Mao went on, 1t-~'1e are ready to devote our entire 
strength to this movement and to • • • engage in joint struggle to-
gether with all parties, groups, and people who do not want to be-
come slaves, who want to fight against the destruction of China.,,41 
It was a time when the situation was critical ~or the Commu-
nists because of the Long March.45 Chiang Kai-Shek in August, 
1936, declared that within three or five weeks he would destroy th~ 
Red Army completely. Mao Tse-Tung, facing this critical moment, 
appealed as follows: "In view of the fact that the life of the 
whole nation is almost on brink of total prostration, we have no 
interest whatever in continuing a civil war in which Chinese fight 
42Ibid., p. 71. 
43ills!.t p. 74. 
44Ibid •• p. 77. 
Ll-5Long March is a. great event of the Chinese Communist histor~ 
From 1934 to 1936 the Red Army under the Kuo M:in Tang's suppressiol 
were forced to carry out a general retreat. They walked through. 
five provinces of Southwest China and finally arrived at north-
west Shensi. This has been the so-called !lLong March" of the 
Chi.nese ComMunis ts. 
against Ch1nese • • •• It the troops ot the Central Government 
or other armed torees tight Japan and refrain trom suppressing the 
s patriotic movement, we are ready to help them sincerely • • 
"~ • • 
The policy ot Kuo Min Tang toward Japan, as ment10ned pre-
viously, was unit1eat1on ot China tirst and res1stance to Japan 
second. Mao Tse-Tung had this in m1nd when he said "The enemy has 
already placed the Central and local governments ot China under 
strict surveillance and is devouring one province atter another. n4 
And he continued: "It should be clearly realized that to unite 
China by armed torce means interm1nable civil war tor China • • • 
We are not against paciflcation, but we qre opposed to c1vil war 
traitors. "48 
The Chinese wealthy classes and the Kuo Min Tang's otticers 
the Communists in great tear lest their wealth and land would 
conti seated by the Reds. Mao, with this in mind, told them tha 
Communist Party had changed its policy and that "the Communis 
d not confiscate the land ot the rich peasants, it they come 
tight aga1nst Japan," and that"the Communists 
not confiscate the land ot anti-Japanese oft1cers."49 Mao 
46Mao Tse-Tung and others, Ch1na:!h! March toward Un1tz, p.72 
47Ib1d ., p. 73. 
48Ib1d., p. 80. 
~ 
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finally emphasized that "the Communists are not hostile to those 
people who take an anti-Japanese stand; ft50 and that "our slogan 
tor the united tront iSI all parties and all classes; unite to 
fight Japan and the traitors. rt51 
The Chinese Communist Party, tollowing Mao Tse-Tung's appeal 
of the tenth of August, addressed an open letter to the Kuo Min 
Tang on August 25. 1936. 52 Realistically, this letter was not 
aimed at the Ello Min Tang itselt, but at the intellectuals and the 
general public. The Chinese intellectuals talked about this lette 
with great enthusiasm when it appeared in the newspapers. This 
open letter contained the same message as the declaration by Mao 
two weeks previous. To Communists, such repetition of their 
appeal was advantageous because a general demand tor immediate war 
against Japan arose trom the flAlI-China National SalVation Union." 
And in addition, Chiang Kai-Shek having already pacified all the 
provincial armies, was ooncentrating his troops to destroy the Red 
army. It was a time when the general confIdence in Chiang Kai. 
Shek was on the increase. The Communists wanted to bring the 
people to distrust Chiang. 
The open letter at tirst made a systematic recount of the 
50Ibid., p. 76. 
51Ibid., p. 78. 
-




aggressive activities ot Japan, and then stated: "Japanese 
imperialism w1ll never relinquish its robber plan ot enslaving 
China until that plan is smashed to atoms at one determined blow 
by all the torces ot China mobilized for battle. The Changes in 
the torm and direction ot the aggression of Japanese imperialism 
• • • 1n no measure signify that Japanese imperialism intends to 
cease its aggression, but are onl, an attempt to facilitate its 
rapacious assault. And anyone Who thinks he can assert that there 
are any fresh hopes of peace ••• 115 only deceiving hlmselt."53 
The letter emulated Chiang's policy---first unif1cation with-
in the nation, then resistance to foreign aggression---by repeat-
ing that the Commun1sts always had desired to unite with any party 
in the fight against Japan; and that if Chiang Kai-Shek would 
accept the Communist Party as an equal political party in the na-
tional government. "the Red Army 115 prepared to subordinate itself 
to the command of the united anti-Japanese army, and to fight on 
any definite section of the front ••• and fulfill the fighting 
tasks entrusted to it. tf54 To show how attractive was the Communis" 
appeal we quote it at length: 
There are two alternatives: to torm an anti-Commu-
nist front, i.e., a united tront to enslave the country, 
together with Japanese imperialism and national traitors, 
or a united anti-Japanese tront, a united tront to save 
53Ibid., pp. 21-22. 
54Ibid., p. 24. 
-
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the country. together with the Communist Party of China 
and the whole of our people. The moment has COlne for 
the final choice. All hesitation and delay will lead 
only to the ruin of the country and the people, and will 
serve the purpose ot Japanese imperialism • • •• 
IN.hen a united front has been set up between us and 
you • • • we will have the right to cry aloud: "Let the 
cowardly traitors and scoundrels cry out in the face of 
Japanese imperialist viol~nce& tChina 1s not strong 
enough to fight Japan.t"5~ 
The influence ot Communist propaganda should not be under-
estimated in judging the situation in China at that time. One 
example of the effect of Communist influence can be found in the 
Sian Case, in whioh Ch1ang Kai-Shek was held as hostage by Chang 
Haueh-Liang. 
The details of the Sian uprising are still not fUlly known. 
According to faots supplied from dIfferent Chinese and foreign 
sources it seems certain that Chang Hsueh-Liang was influenced by 
the Communists. When Japan marched into Manchuria. Chang Hsueh .. 
Liang following Chiang's order withdrew his native troops from 
Manchuria and moved to northwest districts of China. In February, 
1934. Chang waa appointed co~~ander of the foroes assigned to 
suppress uRed Banditry." During the battles with the Red Army 
some officers of Chang were captured. 
~~en these offioers were released by the Red Ar.my, they 
brought baok to Chang glowing acoounts ot the morale and organiza-
tion in the Soviet distriots, but specially of the Red Armyts 
... 
---
"sincerity" in its appeals to stop civil wart to unity China b.1 
peaceful democratic methods, and to unite to oppose Japanese 
aggression. Chang was impressed. As a result slogans became 
current in Chang's army, such as, "Chinese must not tight Chinese.~ 
and ttunite all forces and fight back to our home, Manchuria." 
In addition Chang could not forget that his father, Marshal 
Chang Tauo-Lin, had been killed by Japanese action. It seemed to 
Chang that "Chinese fighting Chinese ft was illogical. Through 
Communist agents he finally reached agreement with the Red A~y to 
cease hostilities in Shensi Province. 
In December, 1936, Chiang Kai.Shek arrived at Sian, the capi-
tal of Shensi, to confer with Chang and urged him to hasten the 
[task of fighting Communists. On the night of December 12 Chang 
revolted and detained Chiang, and under Commun~ t prompting dis-
~atched a circular telegram to the Nanking Government making eight 
~emand8, all of whieh were borrowed from the Communist program, 
~united front against Japan."56 
Chiang Kai-Shek was forced to accept a good portion ot the 
pommunist united front policy. In July ot 1937 the Sino-Japanese 
~ar broke out. An "agreement," "understanding," and "guarantee" 
petween Communists and the Kuo Min Tang was signed on the 22n4 of 
56For details of Sian uprising and the Communist role in it 
~ee I. Jack, "A United National Anti-Japanese Front in China:' Mao 




september. However, there was no real "united rront" during the 
War. 
From the Stlnmler or 1939 to the beginning of 1940 China was in 
serious danger. China was close to surrendering to Japan. Wang 
~hin-Wei, the former chief ot cabinet of the Kuo Min Tang, had 
secretly surrendered to Japan in 1939 and set up a puppet govern .. 
~ent in Nanking for the purpose of uniting with the Japanese agains 
the Chinese Communists. Because the Communists felt that Wang had 
same sort of agreement with Chiang tai-Shek,57 hostilities were 
renewed. 
However, Mao Tse-Tung, on behalf of the Central Committee of 
the Chinese Communist Party, issued several declarations Which 
again called .for a united-rront resistance to Japan instead of 
attack against the Kuo Min Tang. Now the Kuo Min Tang's resis.ance 
~gainst Japan was fully apparent. Likewise, Communists saw that 
without the resistance of the anti-Japanese Kuo Min Tang they could 
not carryon against the Japanese. Therefore, Mao declared: 
~support the Kuo Min Tang-communist cooperation and overthrow the 
anti-Communist poliey or Wang Chin-Wei." Concerning the new 
p.ostilities between the Communists and Kuo Min Tang, Mao simply 
stated: "strengthen national solidarity and eliminate internal 
51Mao Tae-Tuns, "Unite All the Anti-Japanese Foroes and Com-
pat the Anti-Communist Die-Harden (A speech made February 1, 1940), 




frictionl,,58 From that time on Mao unceasingly repeated his 
emphasis on appeal to avoid national friction, which of course 
would e1ther enhance the tendency of surrendering to Japan or 
endanger the Red Army. Such statements were well received by 
Chinese public opinion in Chungking. The idea had begun to grow 
that even Chinese Communist control of China would be better than 
surrender to the Japanese; "China tor the Chinese, rather than for 
foreigners'" 
~ Specific Activities ~ Resistance against Japan 
The Chinese Communists accomplished a great deal, both in the 
cities and the countryside, in winning support to them. Their 
achievements in the cities before World War II have been detailed 
in the paragraphs dealing with the anti-Japanese movement. During 
the War their aim in the cities was mainly to attract those 
stUdents and teachers who lived in the cities occupied by Japan.59 
But the Communists' achievement in rural areas during the War is 
more interesting and important. There, Communist activities were 
more successful during the War than before the War. 'l'he fo110wlng 
58Mao Tse .... Tung, ftOvercome the Danger of Capitulation-Strive 
to Mend the Situation" (a directive written on January 28, 1940), 
Selected Works £!!!£ Tae-Tuns. III (157-160), 159. 
59For details of how Communists endeavored to attract studentf 
and teachers :from Japanese areas see the Communist documents, 
quoted in Michael Lindsay, Notes on Educational Problems in Commu-
nist China,tNew York. 1950), pp. !Ol-Io~. 1'-7-12j, 130. --
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section discusses these activities. 
Anti-Japanese selt-detense Corps. The mobilization ot the 
lPeasantry was the basic tactic ot Mao Tse-Tung in his Communist 
revolution. But after 1931, and partioularly atter 1937, the 
~apanese invasion gave Mao new opportunities to capitalize on the 
~ass-resentment against Japanese, as Mao himself admitted. 60 He 
started to arm the masses into a "Selt-detense Corps" as part ot ar. 
~ti-Japanese program as ~arly as 1931, but his success became 
signiticant only during the second World War. 
The Selt-detense Corps was an "excellent institution for mili-
tarization ot the entire people in the anti-Japanese war, It as Mao 
Tae-Tung himselt s&1d. 61 All men and women between the ages ot 
sixteen and forty-tive were organized into the Selt-detense Corps, 
without distinction aooording to social 01ass.8.62 
The methods ot organizing the masses were complex. Here we 
simplify them to &how the basic procedure. When the Reds occupied 
~ town or a village they first set vp a mass meeting to give ~. 
~easants a theoretical lecture. The Communists would declare that 
Ithe policy of contiscation of lands and properties would apoly onl, 
60Nym Wales, Inside Red China, (New York, 1939), PP. 264, 265; 
~lso Mao Tse-Tung, Ai:ects of China's anti-Japanese Struggle, 
(Bombay, 1948), p. 2 • 
61Mao, Aspecta £t China's anti-Japanese strusgle, p. 37. 
62~., pp. 21, 37. 
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to the Kuo Min Tang's officers and the rich. and would be a policy 
to liberate Chinese people tram Japanese ~peria11sts because the 
Kuo Min Tang and rich had not opposed the Japanese, wh11e the Red 
Army was the real anti-Japanese army.63 Then the Red pol1tical 
workers set out to "persuade" villagers to join in an anti-JapaneSE 
Self-defense lorps.64 
It was very important to arouse patriotism in order to get 
the ignorant people to join in the anti-Japanese organization, as 
a reporter eXPlaIned.65 They were taught a brief history of 
Japanese aggression, Which was traced from the early days, through 
the Sino-Japanese War ot 1894-1895. to the last War. This history 
was given partly through the medium of drama and Harves t Dance or 
Yang-Ko, which will be dealt wi th later, partly through "Winter 
School. n66 partly through leisure time during the evening after 
farming work. In brief, whenever it was possible, illiterate 
peasants were imbued with a deep-seated hatred for the Japanese. 67 
63snow, p. 195. 
643medley, p. 154. 
65Gunther stein, The ChallenS. of Red China, (New York, 1945) 
p.335. - - --
66AcCording to the writer •• mowledge, the Communist "Winter 
School" is the Informal educaticnal Institution in the Red rural 
districts. No certain days of attendance were set. The Communist 
principally gave the peasants political training. 
67Lindaay, pP. 69, '70, 74, 121. 
The duties of the self-defense Corps, according to Mao Tee-
~g's instructions, were: local vigilance, watch, and patrol, in-
formation about the enemy, rounding up of traitors, aid to anti-
~apanese regular troops and guerillas in the transportation ot 
~illtary supplies and wounded soldiers, cleaning of battle.tields 
~d participating in coordinated warfare. 68 
According to Mao's instructions, some details of these activi. 
~ies are given below. In each village and town there were many 
~t. of the self-derense corps.69 In each unit there were certa1r. 
persons loyal to Communists, the "hard core. 1f It was these loyal 
lPersons who controlled the unit and made its members perform their 
~utie8 in the Red rear area. 
The people of Self-derense Corps played a considerable role in 
~ed military operations. They were part ot the Red Army's 
~ntelligence organizations which tunctioned so well that the Commu-
~ist8 could always rely on considerable advance information of 
~nemy moves. 10 For example, if a person of village A saw the enemy 
~ovlng, he must inform village B immediately, regardless of weather 
~illage B must inform village OJ village 0 and the rest tollowed 
~he same procedure until the information reached the Communist 
68Mao , Aspects ~ China's Anti.JaEanese strumsle, p. 40. 
69Ibid., pp. 4.0-4J.. 
10steln, p. 336. 
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center. Walking was substituted tor telephone wiresl 
To show how the Communists utilized the peasants tor wartare, 
we cite some interesting cases. At the end of 1949 the Red 
governors of several provinces made their respective reports. Kuo 
Tze-Hua, then the governor of Shang tung Province, which has a 
population of thirty millions, reported that within three years 
Shantung provided 14,040,000 peasant-soldiers_ Hsio Wang-T'Jng, 
then the governor ot the north part ot Kiangsu Province, with a 
population of about one hundred fifty millions, reported that his 
area provided 1,015,000 men and women peasant-soldiers tor the 
Hsuchow (city) Battle alone, and 1,660,000 for the Yantze River 
Battle. Tfzen Hsi-Wang, then the governor of north part ot Anhui 
Province, whioh has a population of about twenty millions, report-
ed that his area provided more than 8,000,000 men and women for 
the Yantze River Battle alone.7l 
Such large numbers of the organized masses were never used 
to tight JapanJ instead they we~e used to fight the Kuo Min ~ang. 
youth Utilization. The Communist Youth League, established 
in 1931, had great importance tor the Communist movement. Its 
purpose was to attract and organize youth to provide the Chinese 
Communists ot the tuture. Meanwhile, it was advisable to utilize 
71These reports are cited in the writer's diary ot 1949, base 
upon the Chinese Communist newspapers. Women went to the battle 
tor cooking and supplying water and tood, making shoes and uni-
torms, and 80 torth. 
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the youngsters to strengthen the rear. In 1933 this organization 
found seventy thousand recruits in the south central Red districts1 
In 1931 there were some 40,000 members in the Northwest Soviet 
Districts.13 
The C.y.t. divided the youngsters into two camps, the group 
between eleven and sixteen was called Young Vanguards, who were a 
branch of the Red Army, and the group between seven and fourteen 
was euled HErh Tung 'l'uan" or "Children's Brigade." The latter 
was also known by the name of "Haio Kwei Ttleh" or ttLittle Devil 
corps.n74 They did not particIpate in battle. In the following 
paragraphs we will simply describe the latter group. 
For training the youth in the rural areas the Anti-Japanese 
Military and Political Academy in the Central soviet District sent 
out college students tor three-month periods to the countryside to 
train the youngaters. 75 
Principally the children had to learn some Communist worda 
and simple slogans. For examples it began with the words such 
"man" or "human being," and went on to "worker~" "peasant," and 
"soldier,tt then to "army," "Japanese ArnI7," "Red Army." Later the 
72wales, pp. 99, 101. 
73snow, p. 333. According to the writer, the decrease of the 
number ot C.Y.L. is due to the result ot the Anti-Communist 
eampalgn. In 1936 the Red Army numbered only 30,000 men. 
14Raymond J. de Jaegher, The Enemy Within, (New York, 1952), 
p. 201. 
15Wales, p. 307. 
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children were taught questions and answers: "A peasant produces 
rice; a worker weaves cloth. Why can't the peasant eat the rice 
he produces and the weaver wear the cloth he weaves?" tt~Vhy is 
there distinction between the poor andthe rich?" "WhY' are both 
the rich and poor anti-Japanese todaY'?" "WhY' is it that the 
Japanese are the most cruel on earth?ft "WhY' is it that the Red 
AI'my is the anti-Japanese ArmY'?" and so forth. 76 
An important program in the children t • training was to give 
them the ability to use Communist slogans. Even a child of twelve 
or fourteen at a mass meeting could make a simple but competent 
explanation ot the current political situation, and parrot the 
~easons why the Red ArJAY wanted to stop civil war and torm a 
"united front" with all aga.inst Japanese aggression.77 
Children learned games, sports and crude shooting, everything 
~one in the spirit of Communism, of fighting Japanese, and of 
opposing the Kuo Min Tang. They also had to learn propagandist 
songs and dances. They had their own slogan squad., singing 
squads, and dancing and dramatic troupes. 78 
The duties of the ohildren were variou8---most important to 
~ork as orderlies, spies, "teachera" of the illiterate peasants, 
768m.d1ey, p. 468. 
77sno'fl, P. 335. 
78Wales , pp. 100-101. 
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and dancers. When they worked as orderlies~ they were armed with 
short, stout sticks. It a traveler were not quick enough in 
responding to their peremptory cries ot "stop," he would find him-
selt in trouble. It a traveler tailed to Show his pass,19 the 
Little Devils would accuse him of being the Kuo Min Tangls or 
Japan's spy. The children.s activities as spies were generally 
devoted to collecting information about those who opposed the 
Communists, including their own parents, but often they were sent 
to Japanese. and Kuo Min Tang borders to procure information. 
Children who taught the old, Illiterate peasants often beoame 
nasty. spoiled by having more knowledge than the older generation. 
It the old people lacked the patienoe to memorize or understand 
the Communist terms they were acoused of having nfeudalist heads;" 
people who "do not like to resist th$ Japanese. fl8a 
Drama ~ D!Ace. The whole history of the Communist movement 
has been a grand propaganda tour. There is no more powerful weapor 
in the Communist arsenal of propaganda than the Red dr~atic 
troupes of the Jen-Min K'ang-Erh Chu-She or "People's Anti-JapanesE 
Dramatic Society," This dramatic organization was selected and 
formed trom the Vanguard Brigade, made up of boys and girls. It 
79Th. travel paes, aimed to avoid espionage, is a very 8eriou~ 
thing in the Red districts. According to the Communist regulatione 
if a person wants to travel tive Li (12/3 miles) away, he must 
apply for a pass from the Communist looal offioer. 
BOde Jaegher, p. 202. 
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was these youngste~s who t~avelled ceaselessly back and forth in 
the Red dist~iots, sp~eading the gospel of resistanoe and awakenin8 
the slumbe~ing nationalism of the peasants. When the Reds occupied 
new areas, it was these dramatic troupe. who oalmed the tears of 
the people. gave them rudimentary ideas ot the Communists and won 
the people's confidence. 
However badly they had erred, however exaggerated had been 
~ade the emphasis here or the st~ess there, the Communists had the 
p~opaganda aim to arouse the peasants of rural China; to awaken in 
them a beliet that the Communists were the real fighters against 
Japanese aggressors and that the Kuo Min Tang were not. The pea-
sant, although he knew "small Japan" invaded China, did not know 
the brutality ot the Japanese. These teen-agel's made the picture 
vivid in the peasants' minds. 
A reporter gives us an eXQ.ll1ple ot the Red dramas whioh he saw 
personally in the Soviet area.81 This drama was a combination of 
playlets, danoing, singing and pantomine. 'fhe "props" were primi-
tive, but the drama was more etfective for the peasant~y than the 
!elaborate Chinese opera because it dealt with living issues. 
The first playlet was called ttlnvasion. 1f It opens in a 
~anchu~ian village, in 1931, with the Japanese arriving and ~ivln@ 
lOut the "non-resisting" Chinese so1die~s. In the second scene, 




Japanese officers banquet in a peasantls home, using Chinese men 
tor chairs, and drunkenly making love to their wives. Another 
scene shows Japanese dope peddlers selling morphine and heroin and 
forcing every peasant to buy a quantit~.82 A youth who refused to 
buy is singled out tor questioning. 
"You don't buy morphIne, you don't love Manchukuo r Manchuria 
... 
puppet state). You are an anti-Japanese bandit." And the youth is 
promptly execute~. A scene in the village market-place shows the 
Japanese soldiers buying pork without payment. wben the merchant 
asks for money, they look at him in astonishment. "You ask for 
money? ~Vhy, Chiang Kai-Shek gave us Manchuria, Jehol, Chahar, the 
Tangku Truce, the Ho-Umetsu Agreement ••• 83 without asking for 
a sAngle penny, And you want us to pay for a little porkJ" 
~Yhereupon, they impale him as a "bandit." 
In the end, ot course, all this proves too mUch for the 
villagers. Merchants turn over their stands in the market-place, 
farmers rush forth with their spears, women and children eome with 
knives, and all swear to "tight to the deathtl against the Erh Pen 
Kuei Tze---The Japanese Devils. 
The Yang-Ko or Harvest Dance was another propaganda instrument 
82The sale ot narcotics by the Japanese in North China and 
Manchuria was prevalent before the War and during the War, but the 
Chinese were not forced to buy it. 
83Ho-Umetsu Agreement is the result of the Autonomous Movemen1 
of North China, 1935. 
- ---------------
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which was used to arouse the militance of peasants. Its origins 
date baok to the Sung Dynasty, a thousand years ago, the tradition. 
81 harYest danoe performed ohiefly at New Year's and other festiya] 
days. But the Communist artists reformed it for propaganda purposE 
in rural China. 
There are various subjeots depicted in the harvest dances. 
Mostly they deal with battle affairs: the story of a village 
traitor, the heroism of a soldierta wife, the atrocities of the 
Japanese in their mopping-up campaigns.84 
The Harvest Dance is exquisitely done by a group of girls or 
boys, or both. Barefooted, clad in peasant trousers and coats and 
fancy vests, with silk bandannas on their heads, they performed 
with unison and grace, gesturing and speaking. The story is told 
both by gestures and speech. Pantomine and gesture realistioally 
conveyed the spirit of dance. The Harvest Dance gets more 
emotional effect than any communist indoctrinational speeoh oan 
get. 
popular among the Harvest Dances was the "United Front Dance,~ 
which depicted the mobilization of villagers to resist Japan. A 
group ot youths wearing sailors l white jumpers and caps appeared 
as a cavalry formation, another group appeared aa an aviation 
corpa, another performed as foot-soldiers, and the rest as navy.85 
84rIarrison Forman, Report ~ !!.!!! China (New York, 19t~5),p. 64 
85snow, Red star OVer China, pp. 102-103. 
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Whenever an anti-Japanese battle was rought, no matter how 
~lall the battle might be, a Harvest Dance was perrormed immediate-
ly to exaggerate the Red Army's power and to win the peasants' 
conridence. During the latter period or tbe Sino-Japanese war the 
Harvest Dance was mainly perrormed to induce the people to distrust 
the Kuo Min Tang. Such dances were so attractive that many college 
proressors devoted themselves to performing such shows, during the 
beginning of the Red regtme set up in Peking. 
To sum up, basically most of the Chinese had prejudice against 
the Japanese. Because of the Japanese military hostilities agains1 
China the general anti-Japanese resentment became fiercer. The Kuc 
Min Tang's policy concerning Japan was not well understood by the I 
Chinese public. The Communists, therefore, took a full advantage 
of psychology to perform a campaign or the "united front against 
Japan." Before the last World War the Cbinese Communists won a 
great number of the "patriots" in the cities. During the War the 
Communists again taking advantage of the consensus of the publio 
opinion on resistanoe against Japan expanded the Red Army in rural 
areas. Concerning such Communist movement an American reporter 
gave a comment that anti-Japanese slogans had become the core of 
Communist propaganda, and that it was the anti-Japanese campaign 
~hich sustained the Communists through several years or harship.86 
86snow, ~ Battle !£! Asia, (Shanghai, 1941), p. 130. 
CHAPTER IV 
ANTI-AMERICANISM 
As soon as the Chinese Communists came into power, their "one 
sided" policy was made obvious. In the present China there is no 
freedom to discuss imperialists except according to Communist 
interpretation: Russians are Chinats friends and Americans are 
imperialists, the enemy of the Chinese people. Before going on to 
an anal¥sis of the grounds and tactics ot the pro-Russian and anti 
American policy we might present same description of the Chinese 
attitude towards Americans. 
The Chinese Attitude toward Americans _ ..;;;..0,.0-....";;";;;' _____ .;;;.,;;. __ ...;,..;,.,.;. ......... _ ..;.;;.0;.;..;.;;..,;;;,..;;...;;;;. ......... 
Simply and generally speakinl, the attitude adopted by the 
Chinese people toward America is both favorable and unfavorable. 
This idea is not contradictory it ce:rtain facts are considered. 
It is true that American participation in the suppression of 
the Boxers' Rebellion and the "open door" policy have not been 
looked upon by the Chinese intellectuals as desirable events for 
China. But the Chinese, too, have conceded that the Boxers' 
Rebellion was not a rebellion of appreciable importance for 
84 
~h1na.l They also ~emamber that the Boxer indemnity shared by 
~erica was returned by America to the Chinese for educational 
welfa~e. The open door policy, likewise, no longer is considered 
by the Chinese as an example ot military aggression against China. 
The~efore, the Chinese people have a rather favorable attitude 
toward America as compared with other countries such as Britain, 
France, Japan, and Russia. So in China people commonly say that 
"America is better than the other countries" when they talk about 
"foreign imperialists." 
During the !CUO M.ln Tang regime pro-Amel'ican and anti-Russian 
policy prevailed. The efreats of this policy were significant 
because the Chinese people saw that there had never been any 
American concessions and particular privileges in eh1na. On the 
contrary, the Chinese realised that Russia had important military 
and political conflicts with China both in the past and the modern 
times. 
Some Qhinese folksayings ahow this distinctive attitude towarc 
Americans. The Chinese used to call America ItTa Lo Mei" (the big 
America) and American people "Mei Kuo Ta Shao Yeh" (American play-
boy). These appellations in the Chinese language have respectful 
connotations. However, the Chinese used to call the Russians 
IThe Boxers' Rebellion is condemned by Chiang Kai-Shek and 
praised by Mao Tse-Tung. Most of Chinese intellectuals in modern 
times do not endorse the Boxers' activities. 
-- --- - -----
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UEh-Kuo Ta-Pi-Tze" (Russian big nose) or "Chung Lo Eb tt (poor old 
Russia), both comtemptoou8 terms. 
It is also true, on the other hand, that the Chinese have an 
unfavorable attitude toward Americans. An important factor in the 
unravorable attitude is the soci~ gulf between the Chinese and 
American way of life. The Chinese people have misunderstood the 
Americans, particularly the American troops who were stationed in 
China during the last War. The Chinese people, in viewing AmericaI 
customs, complained 1?hat "Americana are sO tree," nso impolite," 
and "so romantic. 1t Americans seem free beoause they are more 
friendly than the Chinese in expreseing the "j.ndi vidual manners 
and attitudes. Americans seem impolite because they are more fran~ 
in meeting people than the Chinese are. Americans seem romantic 
because they do not show embarrassment such as the Chinese do when 
women and men meet together. ot major importance is that the idea 
of the American way of life accepted by the Chinese people is that 
which appeared in Hollywood films, The Chinese people concluded, 
therefore, that Americans are t'not so moral." 
An American sociologist has reported that the Chinese anti-
Amerioan attitude has been influenced by some "concealed contempt" 
adopted by Americans toward the people of China. 2 One of the 
important factors in the "concealed contempt" idea seems to be 




Chinese primitive sanItary condIticns.3 When Americans, particu-
larly missionaries and soldiers, went to China and confronted the 
prtmitive sanitary conditions, they sometimes did little to conoea 
their opinion of the Chinese as dirty people. The Chinese people, 
in turn, reacted against the Amerioans. 
Another psychological faotor might be Chinese jealousy of the 
"luxury" of the American living. Although it is difficult to make 
a oomparison of the Chinese and American living conditions, it 
must be agreed that in China there is a general poverty. In the 
Chinese culture, poverty can give people encouragement, while 
luxury tends to drown people in immorality; if a person lives in 
the lap of luxury, he cannot withstand hardship of his life and it 
is diffioult for him to know the future. The Chinese people thus 
regard the American people in general. They say that Americans 
have money, but they do not have a high moral tone in their societ 
Concerning the American $oldiers, the writer heard from the Chines 
that American and British soldiers could not fight a hard battle 
during the Second World War; they won because they had money and 
weapons. Also American students have been regarded by Chinese 
students in China as not working hard in sohool because their 
families have "plenty of money." 
JA description of Chinese primitive sanitary conditions is in 
Gerald F. Winfield, "China Basic Problems," Foreign Policy Reports 
XXV (March 15, 1949), 2-~. 
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A common sociological and psychological theory holds that 
"prejudice against one mInority group [is] generally accompanied by 
prejudIce against all other groups.n4 Thus, the unfavorable atti-
tude adopted by the Chinese people toward Americans might be 
psychologically influenced by the hostile attitude toward other 
foreigners. The psychological precept is this: \Vhen people fall 
themselves, they will complain against everything and everybody. 
So in modern China the Chinese people often say, "Americans are 
foreigners; foreigners are always pro-foreigners," or "America wil 
stand by another foreign country rather than by China." But, to 
be sure, the modern Chinese peoDle (except Communists) do not see 
America as the "imperialist aggressor" against China. 
Finally, it must be pOinted out again, the unfavorable atti-
tude toward America is less when political issues are eonsidered. 
The attitude toward other foreign countries, particularly Russia. 
is rather a traditional resentment, which is more based on inter-
national political conflicts. Consequently, the Communists have 
made efforts to shift resentment from Russia toward America. They 
have endeavored to promote their one-sided program to the extreme. 
~ Co~ist Reasons !2! Teaching People ~ Resent 
America and Befriend Russia ----~~ --- ------~ ----~ 
4Jerome Hlmelhoch, "A Personality type Associated with 
Prejud1ce~ Race prejudice and Discrimination, ed. Arnold M. Rose, 
(New York, 19:5I), p. 487. -
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General Observations. Moscow regards the democratic politi-
cal and economic system of the United states as a paramount threat 
to the Soviet Union. During the early days of the Chinese Commu-
nist movement, following Moscow's instruction, anti-AmericanisM 
was promoted, as was seen in the second chapter. Before and 
during World War II, Mao Tse-Tung did not forget that "American im-
perialism" was threatening the U.S.S.R. even while he was engaged 
in an anti-Japanese campaign. 
In regard to the Chinese Communist movement there has been a 
remarkable difference in the policies adopted by Russia and by the 
United States. For example, during the incident ot the 30th Move-
ment of 1925, at Shanghai, which was organized by the Communists, 
the United states, tollowing the British and Japanese, sent war-
ships to Shanghai.5 But Moscow sent several congratulatory 
messages to China urging the Chinese to continue the struggle untiJ 
they had completely ousted all toreign imperialist.. A typioal 
messag~ for example, stated that the Soviet Union was closely 
following the fight ot China's workmen and students for emancipa-
tion from the yoke ot foreign oapitalists and imperiallsts.6 
For another example, in March, 1927, Nanking was captured by 
the army led by a Communist leader Lin Pai-Chu, and a violent riot 
5The New York Times, June 2, 1925, p. 2; June 3, 1925, p. 1. 
--_ .................... 
6Ibid., June 8, 1925, p. 4. 
-
against foreign res1dents and their properties occurred. 7 The 
United states, tor the protection ot its citizens, joined with the 
British in shelling Nanking, as a result of which, it was reported, 
200~QOO Chinese were kllled. S But Moscow called the Nanking case 
1& "blood. ba'lfh in Nanking," made by Amerioans, A Pravda editorial 
Istated. "The oountry ot George Washington and the declaration of 
Independence now appears before China 1n the shape ot the monster 
Williams who drowns the independenoe of the Chire 8e people in a 
flood ot blood." At the same time a manifesto issued by the 
Comintern Central Committee sa~d: "The United states, who flirted 
~ith the Nationalist movement and ooquetted with the Chinese revo-
~ution, threw otf the rosy mask in one instant and revealed her 
~ilitary leadership 1n the work of mass murder and the destruction 
~d ruin of' Chinese oities."9 On the following day the Foreign 
Minister of Kuo Min Tang sent to the Amerioan Consulate regrets 
Por the loss of' American lite. The Chinese Communtsts declared 
funerica to be "imperialist." 
According to Communist politioal philosophy, the Chinese 
1Hu Hua, Hsin Min Chu Chu I Ko ~ Shih, p. 86: also see 
~ New YorkTliiiii, -rarCh2~'9"2r, p;-rJ lireh 26, 1927, p. 1; 
!.arcii27~21, pp. lf3J Maroh 28, 1927, p. 1. 
8The New York Times, ~~areh 25, 1927, p. 20; March ~e, 1927, 
p. 1. ---
9Ibid., March 28, 1927, pp. 1, 3. 
-
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revolution is a part of the world revolution. This has been in-
sisted on trom the hirth of the Chinese Communist Party up to the 
present time. The anti-Japanese War was viewed by Mao Tse-Tung as 
a part of war against world fmperialists. 10 For solving a "part 
of the world problem" a unity of China with Soviet Union is indis-
pensable because nthe Soviet Union,11 Mao Tee-Tung asserted, "will 
be in the vanguard to shake hands with us [communist~ .1111 During 
the early days of the Communist-Kuo Min Tang campaign, the Commu-
nist Party from time to time received practical cooperation from 
Moscow.12 At the same time the Kuo Min Tang had friendly relation-
ships with the United States for more than twenty years. 
Another assumption regarding the creation of a general hatred 
for the United states would seem to be that the Chinese Commun~ ts 
hoped to tap and utilize it at opportune movements. It was also 
important that they try to eradicate any fear of western countries, 
particularly of the United states, and to strengthen Chinese 
lOEdgar Snow, "Interviews with Mao Tse-Tung" (made on NovembeI 
5, 1936), Mao Tse-Tung and others, China: The March toward UIity , 
p. 35; Mao Tse-Tung, Aspects of China's Antr:Japanese strus~ e, p. 
48; Mao, The Chinese Revolution and the Communist par~ (aextbool 
written in Decemoer l~~~), Selectia works of Mao Tse- ng, III 
(72-101), 96; Mao, Hsin Min ~hU Qnu ! Lun TOn~w Democracl) 
(written in January-:-r940'}, TPikfng,-l~) ,pp70-!2. 
llSnow, "Interviews with Mao Tse-Tung," Mao Tse-Tung and othel" 
China: !h! March toward Unit:, p. 40. 
12Tang Leang-Li, Suppressins £i Communist-BanditrI. (Shanghai, 
1934), pp. 59-61. 
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feeling of self-respect which might be important for the confi-
dence of the masses in the Communists. 
Communist Interpretations. To the Chinese Communist mind 
Russian policy seeks for a perpetual peace for mankind. When the 
world accuses Russia of creating social chaos, Mao Tse-Tung is 
moved to answer in this way: 
For a long time the Soviet Unionts foreign policy has 
consistently been a peace policy, whioh means precise-
ly that the interests oE the Soviet Union are interwo-
ven with the interests of the majority of mankind. In 
the past, the Soviet Union not only needed peace for 
socialist construction and had to strengthen its peace-
ful relations with other countries for the prevention 
of anti-Soviet war, but had to check the aggression of 
the fascist countries. to curb the war~ongering acti-
vities of the so-called democratic countries, and to 
delay the outbreak of an imperialist world war as long 
as possible so as to win peaoe on a world-wide scale. 
For years the Soviet Union1has devoted great efforts 
to the oause of the world. 3 
In looking, however, at Amerioan policy, Mao insisted that 
when the United states adopted "the policy of nominal non-
intervention" toward an aggressive country, it was in reality 
oooperating in the aggression. Mao, referring to the Japanese 
war against China, stated that when Japan invaded china the 
United states and other oountries adopted a policy ot nnon_ 
intervention,tt but the Soviet union not only followed a policy 
of non-aggression with China bu, also aotively helped China in 
l3Mao Tse-Tung, "The Unity between the Interests of the 
Soviet Union and the Interests ot Mankind" (written on september 
28, 1939), Seleoted W~ 2.! ~ Tae-Tung, III, It4. 
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he~ ~esiatanc •• 14 Mao Tae-Tung conveniently fo~got the non-
agg~esslon pact which Soviets and Japanese entered into at the 
beginning of the JapaneseWa~. 
Concerning the Seco~d Wo~ld War, Mao, in the same statement, 
said "The governments of Britain, France and the United states had 
no genuine deslre to prevent the g~eat war, but on the contrary 
p~eolpitated lts outb~eak." To lndicate that the Unlted States, 
B~italn and France desired wa~, Mao continued: ttFor they refused 
to come to te~s with Soviet Union, to conclude wlth it a really 
effectlve pact of mutual asslstance • • • this proves that tlley 
only wanted wa~ and did not want peace.nlS 
Mao ag~eed with Stalln that the United states lntended to 
"sit on top of a mountain to watch the tigers flght" and would 
come down to wind up the wholeaffalr When the Sovlet Union and 
Germany should have worn each other out in fighting. l6 He forgot 
that the American military supplies and the Second Front opened by 
Eisenhowe~ aaved the Soviet Unlon from falling into Hitler's hands, 
On December 20, 1939, Mao Tse-Tung, while offering congratula-
tions tor ~talints blrthday, explained why Stalin's Sovlet Union 
was the true friend of China: "No other country has renounced its 





special rights and privileges in China; the soviet Union has done 
this. 
ltDuring the First Great Revolution, all the imperialists were 
opposed to us; the Soviet Union alone aided us. 
"In the Anti-Japanese War, no government of any imperialist 
country has really given us help, the Soviet Union alone has help-
ed us with aeroplanes and supplies. 
"Is this not clear enough?,,17 
Mao Tse-Tung in January, 1940, insisted that the Chinese re-
volution was a "new democratic reVolutIon," based on the princi-
pIes ot Marxism-Leninlsm-Stallnlam, that for victory the Chinese 
revolution must rely on the Soviet Union, and without itussian help. 
China could not win.18 Mao also predicted that all countries in 
the whole world would be swept into either of two camps; that 
neutrality would be merely a deceptive phrase; that the Chinese 
must stand at the socialist side.19 
Mao's opinion of the Vnited states became openly more hostile 
after he came into power. He made a speech before the 28th anni-
versary meeting of the Chinese Communist Party. Mao's theme was 
that under the leadership of Soviet Union in the Second World 
17Mao, "Stalin Is the Friend of Chinese People," Selected 
Works .2!. !!.2. Tse-Tuns. III, 102-103. 
l8Mao , Rsin Min Chu Chu I Lun, p. 23. 
------ ----- ......... --- - --
19Ihi«., pp. 25, 36. 
-
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War three big imperialist countries had been defeated and two big 
imperialist countries had been weakened, and only one big imperial 
ist country, America, continues as a power; "American imperialism 
intends to enslave the whole world, and she is supplying weapons 
to Chiang Kai-Shek to kill millions of Chinese people. tt20 
In the same statement Mao indicated that China needs inter-
national help from the socialist countries, but she does not want 
American aid, beoause American rulers are "imperialists" who can 
never give "people's oountry" real aid. 21 Now, Mao, in this 
speech, made clear the policy of the Red regime: "Chinese people 
must either stand at the imperialist side or at the socialist side 
there 1s no neutral road; but we oppose the imperialist side, and 
we oppose the imagination of neutrality."22 Finally, Mao conclud-
ed that "we must unite with the Soviet Un1on, we must learn from 
the SOViet Union. n23 
During the year 1949, Russian "advisers" began to pour into 
China; and the Chinese intellectuals, in general, had the feeling 
that these "advisers" seemed interested only in political affairs. 
~~e intellectuals doubted the value of such advisers, and general 
2OMao, tun Jen Min Min Chu Chutan Chin (~ Peoplets Democrati( 
DictatorshlJ)J,(Peking; ~9r;-pp. 8:-4.- . 
2lIbld. , 
-
PP. 8, 9. 





opposition was prevalent. At the same time the Chinese people 
were aware that Russia had been moving industrial equipment from 
Manchuria while the United states poured into China a billion 
dollars worth of relief goods and industrial equipment for recon-
struction. 
Liu Shao-Chi, then the vice-president of Red Government, mad. 
a statement which was characteristic of the attempt to mitigate 
anti-Russian attitudes and strengthen Sino-Russian friendship. 
Since he is an important man in shaping the ties of China with the 
Societ Union, we quote his article at length: 
We speCially prize this friendship and cooperation 
between Chinese and Soviet people because the path tra-
versed by the Soviet people is the path which we Chinese 
will 800n take. The experiences of the Soviet people in 
national construction are worthy of careful study by the 
Chinese people. The Chinese revolution attained the 
Victory of today because we learned fram the SOViet 
Union in the past and took "Russia as teaCher." Hence-
forth, we are going to build up the country, and must 
likewise take "Russia as teacher" and study the experi-
ences in national construction of the Societ people. 
The Soviet Union has now much scientific knowledge 
which is enti~ely new and unknown to the rest of the 
world. We can learn such scientific knowledge only 
from the Soviet Union. For example_ in the tield of 
economics, banking, public finanoe commerce_ education, 
etc., the Soviet Union has an entirely new set of 
theory which other countries of the world do not have, 
not to mention her advanced political science and mili-
tary science. Soviet culture is an entirely new cul-
ture. The pressing task betore the Chinese people to-
day 1s to absorb the new culture of the Soviet Union 
and to make it the orientation for building up the new 
China. Henoe we Chinese are especially in need of 
friendly aid and cooperation of the Soviet people. 24 
24Liu Shao-Chi. "Sino-Soviet Friendship". China l/eeklv Review 
Llu Shao-Chi made another statement of revealing importance. 
Liu distinguishes the nAmeric~n imperialist camp" and the ftanti-
American imperialist camp" more sharply than Mao Tse-Tung. Liu 
stated: 
When these two camps are in sharp conflict, people line 
up with one side or the other. That is, if one is not 
in the imperialist camp, if one is not assisting Ameri-
can imperialism and its accomplices to enslave the world 
or one's own people, then one must be in the anti-im-
perialist camp assisting all oppressed peoples of the 
world fighting to achieve liberation, or fighting for 
the liberation of onets nation against Amerioan imperial-
ism and its aceomplioes---the reactionaries in all 
countries. This means one is assisting the Soviet Union] 
the New Democracies ot Eastern Europe, the people's de~ 
moeratic foroes in the United states and other countries. 
To remain neutral or sitting on the fence is impossible 
• • •• In order to win its liberation, every oppress-
ed nation has no alternatiVe but to oppose American im-
perialism and ••• to unite with the Soviet Union •• 
•• No nation can win real liberation any other w8'1.25 
In January, 1950, Soong Ching-Ling (widow of Sun Yat Sen), a 
vice-president ot the Red Government, made a comparison of the 
United states with Russia. 26 She partioularly pointed out that th 
Marshall Plan could produce only economio catastrophe for those 
countries which received Ameriqan aid. A statistical ana17sis of 
Soon clatmed that there had been a serious economic crisis and 
(ShanghaI'), CXV, No.9 (October 29, 1949), 142. 
25Liu Shao-Chi, Internationalism and ~ationalism (written 
in 1948), (Peking, 1950), pp. 32-33. ---
26"The Difference Between Soviet and American Foreign Poli-
cies," People's China, I, No.2 (January 16, 1950), 5-8. 
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unemployment problem in Italy, France, Britain, and west Germany 
since these countries received Marshall Plan aid. 
Soongts analysis also claimed to show that there had been a 
great increase of industrial product and economic prosperity in 
Czechoslovakia, Rumania, Bulgaria, Albania, Hungary, poland, and 
Red China, since these received "Stalin Plan" aid. soongts theory 
is that the Marshall Plan was mainly aimed to educate people to 
follow the leadership of the United states; the stalin Plan, how-
ever, was aimed to "sincerely aid the development of the [Red] 
Countries." Soong concluded that the United states is an im-
perialist country and the Sovlet Union is the democratic. 
Propaganda ~ Means ~ Training ~ People 
The Chinese Communist movement is a grand propaganda tour, as 
mentioned previously. According to Mao Tse-rrung every Chinese 
must be a propagandist: "Who is a propagandist? Not only is the 
teacher a propagandist, the newspaper reporter a propagandist, the 
literary writer a propagandist, but all our cadres in all kinds of 
worts are also propagandists •• • • Any person engaged in talki~~ 
with another person 1s engaged in propaganda. u28 In Red China, 
therefore, the news, art, llterature, mass meetlngs, and schools, 
28Mao Tee-Tung, "Opposing Party Formalism" (a speech made in 
February, 1942), quoted In Chen Hsi-En, "Education and propaganda 
in Communist China", The Annals of the American Academl of Politi-
cal ~ Soclal Sclence;-COLXXII tseptember, 1951}, 113. --
are full of propaganda, the propaganda ot anti-Americanism. It is 
worthwhile to introduce a number of examples of this propaganda. 
Regarding the defeat of the Japanese in the last War the 
Chinese people believed that it was the Kuo Min Tang's eirftt years 
resistance. America's tremendous aid. and especially the two atomi 
bombs which forced Japa~ts earlier surrender. The Chinese people 
realized that Russian participation in the Japanese War did not 
play an important role. However, this conviction deviated from 
the Communist Party Line. Communists through their newspaper and 
magazines began to reject the "incorrect" viewpoint during the 
year 1949. One of the interpretations, which was made on August 
15, 1949, seems to be typical: 
The surrender of the Japanese pirates resulted 
trom the heroic eight-year resistance of the Chinese 
people. and especially of the Red Eighth Route Army 
under the leaderabip of the Communist Party •••• The 
final factor bringing about the Japanese surrender was 
the Soviet declaration of war on Japan on August 8, 
1945 • • •• Within a week the Soviet Red Army. in con-junction with the forces of Outer Mongolia. •• des-
troyed or captured 764,000 men of the Japanese Imperial 
Kuantung Army • • •• If the soviet Union had not sent 
troops into Manchuria, a military decision could not 
have been reached so speed~ly, therefore Japan still re-
tained a very powerful army at the time ••• with 
which it could have continued resistance against the 
allied forces • • • • 
The American imperialists, however, with their 
running dogs, the Kuo Min Tang reactionaries, spread 
propaganda to the effect that the defeat of Japanese 
tasoism resulted solely from the use of two atomic 
bombs. Such talk 1s oompletely deceptive, for even 
though Soviet partioipation in the Japanese war came 
late, the fact remains that, if the Soviet people ead 
not been ready, with their spirit of lofty self-sacri-
fice, to resist and destroy Hitlerts great armies in the 
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west, America would certainly have been unable to con-
duct her offensive against Japan in the Pacific •••• 
The purpose of this deceptive talk on the part of 
the Americans and their running dogs is to conceal their 
sin of seizing and holding the fruits of Victory for 
themselves alone', and, by exaggerating the power of the 
atomic bomb, to terrorize the people of the world's va-
rious peace-loving cquntries in order to facilitate 
their own dark designs for conducting new aggression as 
conditions permit • • • .29 
One might wonder how many people were convinced by the commu-
nist interpretation. To answer is difficult. An important consi-
deration in any answer would be the success the Communists have in 
indoctrinating the young generation. 
A popular pampnlet in Communist-dominated China is called 
American Imperialist's Bloody Historl of Aggression in China, 
which gives America the dubious credit of having a share in every 
war against China. A summary of this small book is given below. 
In 1842 American soldiers helped English soldiers fight the 
Opium War. In 1874 an American admiral placed the American flag 
on Formosa and declared it independent. In 1875. the United state 
consul at J.t'ukien went to Japan and urged that the United states 
and Japan take Formosa. In 1884, together with Japan. the United 
states attack~d Korea. Ten years later the United states helped 
Japan to start the Sino-Japanese War. In 1900 America joined the 
other imperialists in taking Peking, because of the obstinacy of 
29Q.uoted in Derk Bodde, pekins Diary, !.!!!.!: .2!. Revolution, 
(New York, 1950), pp. 237-238. 
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some missioners. In 1964 the United states used forty million 
dollars to help Japan in the war so as to share in the spoils of 
China's northeast provinces. In 1912, America joined the European 
Powers in exploiting China afteJ.' declaring for the "open door." 
In 1925 American inteJ.'ference stopped the Communist revolution in 
China and set up a government favorable to 8merica. American re-
lief was given to unload American surpluses and make economic 
slaves of China atter the War. Arms were given Chiang Kai-3hek 
and his reactionary government, which cost more blOod and lives in 
the Communist revolutionary army fighting to liberate China.30 
On the contrary, Russia has no record of any aggression 
against China aa tar as the Communists are concerned. When Ohine54 
intellectuals and western observers viewed Sino-Russian friendship 
wi th a doubtful attitude, the vice-minister of the Educal;ion De-
partment in peking stated: "The treaty of Sino-Soviet Friendship, 
Alliance and Mutual Assistance is based on truth and justlce. ft 
The imperialists, the vice-minister pointed out, intend to slander 
and blacken the Soviet and Chinese people when they talk about the 
questions ot ManchurIa, Mongolia, and Sinkiang. Also he added: 
The Chinese people have never, under any circumstance, been antl-
lRussian."3l 
30Reterred to by Mark Tannien, No Secret Is Safe, (New York, 
P.952), p. 128. - --
31Chien Chun Ju1, "Let the Imperialists TrembleJ" People's 
PhIna, I, No.5 (March 1, 1950), 5-7. 
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Since the Chim se people have been aware of the Russian 
occupation of Arthur and Dairen, a typical device of Communist in-
terpretation appeared in March, 1950. It indicated that the 
Russian occupation of Arthur and Dairen was for the liberation of 
Chinese residents there; the living standards, industrial products 
children's education, and women's movement were improved to a grea 
degree after the arrival of "the Soviet protectors," so that the 
Chinese people "love the Soviet protectors. tt32 
A book entitled .Q.a Americanism was published in 1949. The 
ti tle of the first chapter asks n'Nhat Is Americanism?" and the 
rest of the volume is devoted to proving that the answer really is 
fascism. The book attempts to 4emonstrate that the United states 
has already become a police state with secret police (FBI) and the 
"slave labor" Taft-Hartley Law. 
The result of the ftfascist control of the United states" is a 
combination of war-mongering and degeneracy. Vyshinsky before the 
United Nation General Assembly of September 18, 1947, denounced 
the United states leaders as warmongers. A typical elaboration of 
the theme appeared in the Peking papers on November 26, 1950: 
"There has been a big national boom in caves [in the United state~ 
Slick real estate merchants are helping to spread panic among the 
bourgeoisie and cashing in by otfering for sale dry, deep, sizable 
32Chow Hsueh-Sheng, ttThe story of Port Arthur and Dairen,1t 
People's China. I, No. b (March 16, 1950), 6-7. 27. 
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caves in Arizona and other remote spots. A lunatic character 
named Bobson has built an underground city in Kansas which he has 
called Eureka. There he is setting up offices and homes, with all 
modern conveniences."33 
The Chinese Communists seemingly do not dream that the free 
world might not believe what they say. Thus, WU Hsiu-Ch'uan, the 
representative of Red Government invited to attend the United 
Nations assembly, made a bitter denounciation of the United states 
before the United Nations on November 28, 1950. 3L~ Referring to 
the Korean War WU insisted that it was started by the United 
states, and that the Unite4 states Government was designed 90lely 
to furnish a pretext for launching aggression againRt every Asian 
country. Att·er the War, Wu pointed out, only because of the 
efforts and sacrifices of the people of China and Rus~ia the power 
of Japan in China was weakened; and taking advantage of this 
opportunity the United states stepped up the execution of its poli 
cy of sole dominance over China. 
To oppose the general feeling that Americans have been the 
traditional friends of the Chinese people, Wu asserted that 
Americans are imperialists who have never been the friends of the 
33Quoted in Richard L. Walker, "Communist China Looks at the 
United states;' !!!! Revie,:w, XLI (Autumn 1951), 29-
34Text of 1/VU'8 speech is in The New York Times, November 29, 
1950, section 1, pp. 14·16. --- --- ----
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Chinese; instead they have always been the Chinese enemies as 
history shows. Wu's attack is not a new thing. Betore the Korean 
War the Communist Party had already made similar charges, but they 
were hardly noticed in t~ United states. 
Liu Shao-Ch'! in November 1948 made this statement: 
Even during the Second World War, the American im-
perialists had made their plans for plundering and op-
pressing all the nations of the world. After the war, 
they put the Truman Doctrine and Marshall Plan into ope-
ration, thus step by step bringing many oountries and 
nations of the world under their own control and rule • 
• •• And their aggressive plans just like those of 
Hitler, Mussolin1 and Japanese warlords, are being car~ 
rled out under the slogan ot "defence against the 
SoViet, defense against Communism." 
In order to put their plan for enslavement of the 
whole world • .. • the American imperialists • • • have 
to carry out propaganda among the American people about 
the "theory" of the so-called tf American Century!! and 
the "theory" of the "superiority ot the white race," de-
claring that the United states should tflead the world" • 
.. • .3;, 
The charges about the ttAmerican Century," "superiority or 
white race," "America is the leading country of the world" have 
been a current phenomenon in China a.1"ter the War. Liu t s charge 
seems an attempt to regenerate the Chinese traditional self-feelinf 
of "supremacy," in order to conquer a fear of America. 
The ~-~ ~-!!2 (Southern DailZ)' official organ of the 
CCP in Canton, published an article almost at the same time that 
Wu Hsiu-Chuan was in the United states. This article made an even 
35Liu Shao-Ch'i, Internationalis~ ~ Nationalism,(Peking, 
1949), pp. 27-28. 
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stronger attaok on the United states. 
EYery Chinese oitizen who is willing to recognize 
facts may discern what kind of country the United sta-
tes is. This is a country which 1s thoroughly reaction-
ary, thoroughly dark, thoroughly corrupt, thoroughly 
cruel. This 1s • • • the hell of countless m11lions of 
poor people. This is the parad1se of gangsters, swind-
lers, rascals, special agents, tascist germs, specula-
tors, debauchers, and all the dregs of mankind. This 
is the world's manufactory and source or all such crimes 
as ••• darkness, cruelty ••• op)ression ot man by 
man, and cannibaliam. This is the exhibition ground ot 
all the crimes which can possibly be committed by man-
kind. This is a living hell ten times, one hundred 
times, one thousand times worse than any hell that can 
be depicted by the most sanguinary of writers •••• 
Conscientious persons can only wonder how the spiritual 
civilization of mankind can be depraved to such an ex-
tent' Here is the graveyard of truth, righteousness, 
reason, progressiveness, science and culture •••• 
Everyone who is conscientioUS, rational, truth-worship-
ping, willing to uphold the dignity and morality ot man-
kind and unwilling to see mankind degraded to a level 
lower than a~als, cannot help arising in righteous in. 
dignation to condemn the cursed phenomena ot this oursed 
place. E~.ryone who does not want the people of this 
beloved fatherland contaminated by these criminal pheno-
mena is charged wit~ the responsibility 9f arising to 
condemn her, curse ~er,and despise her.3b 
Such oharges against the United states deal chiefly with the 
ff American way of life. tt Since the Chir.e se Communist view is 
presented within a Marxist-Leninist framework, the IIAmerican way 
of lire " is pictured as a life of increasing oppression of the 
proletariat by the American capitalists. This is made easier by 
the fact that the high. standards of living in the United states or 
the rreedomsot the people are beyond the understanding ot the 
36Quoted in Walker, PP. 26-27. 
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poor Chinese people. 
For the young people, songs, cartoons, and small pamphlets 
are good eduoation devices. One such typioal pamphlet is entitled 
IntroduCing !h! paper Tiger, Imperialist Amerioa. The ti~er fills 
Chinese painting a.nq. literature and is the "bogy" used to frighten 
people, as the "big, bad wolf" is used in American children's 
books. Amerioa, in this pamphlet, is called a "paper tiger"---a 
big bluft-- as Mao Tse-TUng used to use the word to symbolize the 
ftimperialist" country. This pamphlet belittles the Amerioan atomi 
bomb as a weapon of no use against armies, a weapon which can be 
used only to kill the defenceless civilian populations of large 
cities. It America should risk bombing China, Russia would im-
mediately carry retaliation to the "American imperialism." The 
pamphlet also encourages the Chinese youngsters to believe that 
American soldiers are soft, raised on luxuries, and cannot take 
the hardship at fighting. 
Another booklet for youth bears the title Instruction ~ 
youth !! ~ Age ~ Reason. On each page it has cartoons. It 
picture. America as a hog that lives on blood, blood let by war. 
'Nhen buainess is bad, America starta a war so the capitalists can 
make money and retain their power. 
Another, The Two Fronts, is given over to exposing the "aggre I" 
sion" of America primarily, though a small share in the "sin" is 
attributed to England and France. The Imperialistic aggression is 
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compared to the admirable peace front of Russia. Naturally all th 
conferences, the meetings, the societies, the propaganda and 
efforts Russia has given for peace are recorded. 
The Communists also translated RUsSian propaganda into the 
Chinese language. One such translation 1s called The Livine 
Standar~s of Russian People, and is designed to attract students 
of high schools. It pictures Russia as a paradise and her people 
as living the most comfortable of lives. 
An article by Hu Sheng entitled "American Aggression Against 
China through the Course of Historylt appeared in a Peking journal 
on November 20, 1950. The author said: flShowing his white-gloved 
hand, the American imperialist would say to the Ch1nese peop~ : 
'Look at my hand; how clean it isl I have never taken any aggres-
sive action against China. I have always been Chinats good 
friend.' 
"Pulling off his gloves, you will see his blood of the Chines 
people, blood of the Asian peoples, which cannot be cleaned."37 
To prove the moral decadance of the Americans, one Pek1ng 
magazine carried the following account under the title "Lying is 
Wonderful!" 
The American Liars Club is ~wenty years old. In order 
to celebrate the twentieth anniversary, a ly1ng compe_i-
tion was held to determine the world champion liar. At 
the beginning of the contest • • • the Chairman of the 
37 Quoted in ibid., p. 31. 
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club said: "Lying is a great art, a great movement. We 
hope to discover many new talents this year." Although 
the result of the competition has not yet been announced, 
one thing is certain: the winner of the contest will be 
assured of finding work wlthspubllshers of the yellow press In the United states. 3 
Communist songs are varied. Most of them are written princi-
pally for children and the uneducated masses. One suoh is "Follow 
Mao Tse-Tung," which goes: 
Pollow, follow Mao Tse-Tungl 
They cannot be American slaves. 
• • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • 
another song 1s called "Party Line": 
P~rty L1ne, Party Line' 
• • • • • • • •• • • • • 
The whole world follows party line' 
The imperialists are aggressing, 
The powerful Russia is insisting peace' 
• • • • • • • • • • • • 
stalin is Victory, 
Mao Tse-Tung i8 victorYl39 
DurIng the Korean ~far a literary movement to I'Resist America, 
Assist Korea,ft was promoted by Communist writers. A writer, Chten 
Huan-Mei, made a report before "The Artists Resist America, Assist 
Korea Propaganda Committee of Middle-south China." Ch'en's report 
advocated that Chinese writers join the anti-American propaganda 
3SQuoted in ibid. J p. 3!~. 
-
39Referred to Li Pan-yu, Ko Ch'ien You Erh (A Chinese trans-
lation of Mark Tennien, No Secret Is Safer; tHOng Kong, 1953), 
pp. 107-110. Aocording"'t'lS the prennt Writer Tennien t s transla-
tions of Communist songs are not accurate. 
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movement. To quote: 
Especially American imperialists • • • have engaged in 
deceptive propaganda against Chinese people for many 
years. From the American propaganda Chinese people en-
gendered a psychological tendency of pro-America, res-
pecting Amerioa, and tearing America; we have to spread 
our propaganda to correct this wrong trend, and we have 
to create a psychological wave ot hating Am~rica, des-
pising Amerioa, and belittling Amerioa. This propagan-
da must be taken in torms ot arts and literature ••• 
• We have to ooneentrate all our ettPsts to the campaign 
against Amerlc~ imperialists • • • .4 
Similar committees had been formed in other cities. The re-
sult of this movement was that new dances and songs were developed 
Here is a song entitled "Beat the Mad Dog": 
American imperialist is a mad dog. 
Hetll bIte you whenever he sees you; 
If you are afraid of him, 
His bravery beoomes restless, 
It you beat him bitterly, 
Hefll be knooked down. 
Beat the mad doS, 
Seat the mad dog, 
Don't let the mad dogblte youl41 
During the Korean War Chinese peasants under Communist force 
were "voluntarily·t working tor control over the liuen River, which 
had caused catastrophes to farms tram year to year. But the 
Communists conveniently tied up this domestic problem with the 
Korean War and America. A song was worked out for encouragement 
of peasants, which rans 
4°Quoted in Tin Mia, Chung-Kung Wen-Yi Tsuns-Pi-Pen (On 
Chinese _C_omm~u~n_1_s_t A£! ~ tlterature), (Hong kong, 1954), P7 166. 
41q~uoted in ibid •• p. 167. 
-
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American soldiers are mixed-bred sons, 
'rheir Korean aggression wi th their defeat will oome along, 
The more deteated the madder they become. 
• • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • 
They are weak since they are a paper tiger, 
China has full man-power, 
First, we have to control the river. 
Then we can break up the paper tiger.42 
Besides the anti-American tones there is also something in 
praise of Stalin. Thirty-two poems written by Kuo Mo-Jo, a famous 
scholar and a top offioial of Peking Government, are the most popu 
lar. To show the oharacteristic to~e of pro-Russian art we select 
several lines: 
Stalin, great Stalin! 
• • • • • • • • • • • Thank you grandpa Stalin, 
Thank you Soviet uncles, 
You have liberated us! 
• • • • • • • • • • • • 
To you, stalin, 
Atomio bomb is a child game, 
Germ wartare is a nightmare! 
Your vigor can melt the iceland 
Your kindnesw can tertilize the 
Your wisdom can change a river, 
ot the Artie Pole, 
Sahara Desert. 4 
move a mountainl 3 
This sort of songs, or poem, of oourse is looked upon by the 
intelligentsia a.s ohildish. But ohildren walking in the streets, 
working on the farms, sing them loudly. For their future the 
Communists look primarily to the young generation. 
American social problems are also used for propaganda materia 
42Ibid., p. 168. 
-
43Ibid., pp. 281-282. 
-
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The p~opagandists have lea~ned from the Amerioan press the proble.~ 
of drug addiotion, raoe riots. rape, mu~der, and partioularly 
statistios, like the statement by the FBI that in 1950 a major 
orime is committed every 18.7 seoonds in the United states. So a 
Chinese Communist author said "there are at least 80 horror broad-
oasts per week on the major United states radio network." 
They know that juvenile delinquency is a ourrent problem in 
the United states, and that moving pioture, are said by sociolo-
gists to have played a part in its development. Therefore, the 
Chinese Communists waged a oampaign against Hollywood films, from 
the end of 1949 to the end of 1950. Letters from the "readers" of 
~ewspapers a~d magazines blamed the American moving pictures for 
Itheir "sins against the state" and for children's misconduot. One 
~oy had broken his arm, he said, by trying to imitate TarzanJ 
~other, who staged a daylight robbe~y, blamed Hollywood gangster 
~ilms for the suggestion. Murder and detective films, the Commu-
nist press said, "are purposely given the Amerioan public to dis-
traot them from the aoute·and distressing social problems that 
oontront them." 
The Chinese Communist apparently do not tire of ascribing 
'bestial conduct" to the Americ~n troops throughcut the world. 
~ery unfavorable incident in whioh Amerioan troops in China were 
~nvol ved during the Seoond '/yorld i,'tar has been preserved and elabo-
rated upon. The chroniole given to the Chinese people would 
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indicate that the American troops limited their activities overseal 
to pillage, murder, rape, and beating the people of friendly 
nations. This kind of propaganda is based upon an instruotion 
given by the Communist Party in mid-summer of 1951. The instruc-
tion reads: "In certain cities where American troops were statione( 
during World War II accusation of the United states atrocities 
should be made. In accusation of the Unites states ••• inter-
1udes of emphatic speeches are necessary to stress the fact that 
American imperialists are brutal •••• n44 
In the United states, of course, as in other countries there 
are social classes, and unemployment was a problem in the past. 
But the Communists thrIve on exaggeration. A book stated that 
"the Du Ponts gave a ball that cost a half-million U.S. dollars. 
The Cigars cost $250 per box tor these capitalists, while the in-
oome of a poor worker in America is only $200 a year."45 Mao Tun, 
Minister ot Cultural Affairs, in an article of December 5, 1950, 
made the absurd statement that there are over 15 million unemploy-
ed in the United states and that millions are on the verge of 
starvatIon. 46 
Anti-Christianitl !! Anti-Americanism 
44Quoted in Gretta Palmer, God's Underground ~!!!!, (New 
York, 1953), p. 253. 
45TennIen, pp. 128-129. 
46walker, p. 21. 
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Communists know there is an intrinsic contradiotion between 
Christianity and Communism. But they have promised "freedom ot 
religious faithtf in their oonstitution and in their general propa_ 
ganda. The oondition tor freedom of religious faith must be based 
on the Communist Party Line. Mao Tse-Tung in his People's Democra· 
!!2 Dictator.hip indicated that a person who follows the Communist 
has demooratic freedom, while a person Who does not follow the 
Communists must be oppressed. To eradicate Christianit¥. especial. 
1y the Catholic Church, must inevitably be the Communist aim. 
However, Communists have insisted that Christianity in China is 
the result of American imperialist aggression. The Red soldiers 
were taught that Christianity was invented by Americans. 
In the beginning ot the Red regime the Communist attitude 
toward the Protestants was more benevolent than that toward the 
Catholics. In April 1949, the Minister of Education Department of 
Peking stated: "'rhe Chinese Communists did not interfere with the 
missionary schools. For example, the president of Yenching 
(protestant= University is still Dr. Lu Chi-Wei. The only excep. 
tion to this rule is Fu-Jen University [The Catholic university] 
because the American Catholic priest in charge was very depostlc 
as well as ~eactionary, he was strongly opposed by the Chinese 
members of staff, who petitioned that the University should be 
taken over. "47 
47Quoted in Lindsay, Notes on Educational Problems 1n 
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China's entrance into the Korean War made things worse tor 
Christian schools. The Communists tinally took over Fu-Jen Uni-
versity on October 12, 1950. Following this, anti-Christianity 
grew tierce. On Deoember 30, 1950, a statement of Red Government 
was issued: 
The Government administrative Couneil of the Cen-
tral People's Government yesterday adopted a "Decision 
on Polioies tor Dealing with ~~erioan Subsidized Cul-
tural", Eduoational and Relief Organlzatic·ns and Heli-
gious Bodies." fj,'he polioies which are embodied in a re-
port made at the counoil meeting by Vice-Premier i~uo ;.Io-
Jo, are as follows: First, the Government should plan 
and assist people in such a way as to make American sub-
sidized cultural educational and religious relief organi-
zations and religious bodies completely self-sufficient. 
Second, American-subsidized cultural, educational and me-
dical organizations should be • • • taken over by the 
Government and transformed into state-owned enterprises • 
• • • Third, American-subsidized relief organizations 
should be c~~pletely taken over and run by the Peoplets 
Relief Administration of China. Fourth, American-subsi-
dized Chinese religious bodies should be brought under 
~le complete management of Chinese believers. The 
Government should encourage4§heir movement to become in-dependent, self-sufficient. 
Following this government policy, in mid-February, 1951, the 
Baptist University of Shanghai a.nd Roman Catholic Aurora Universi-
ty were officially taken over by Government. On February 12, 1951 
Yenching University was seized. Later, the other nine colleges 
opperating with Amerioan funds were taken over. 
~ Communist China, p. 176. 
48Quoted in Richard Arens, "The Impact of Connnunism on Educa-
tion in China," Unpublished Doctoral Dissertation, (University ot 
Chioago, Chicago, 1952), p. 88. 
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The instructions of the Government insisted that all middle 
sbhools and universities should sYstematically expose and criti-
cize the "eVil influences of American imperialism's past propagan-
da activities" in China; and that youthful stUdents were to be en-
abled to gain a concrete understanding of the "fact" that "Americal 
imperialism was a threat to the.Chinese people."49 
From 1951 to the end of 1952 a great deal of anti-Christian 
literature appeared in magazines and newspapers, A typical articlE 
was \'Il"i tten by a Chinese protestant leader Who was graduated from 
Columbia University and Union Theological Seminary in the United 
states. The author stated that American missionaries went to Chinl 
basically" for political and mili tary invasion. 11 The Boxer In-
demnity, the author asserted, was used, under a pretext of genero-
sity, to train Chinese students conversant with Americans, and to 
prepare them for the role of propagandists of the American way of 
life.50 The author in this same article listed the statistics of 
the institutions supported by American funds: thirteenuniversities 
203 hospitals, 300 orphanages, 2,318 churches, and 2,634 American 
~issionaries ... - ... all of these were for the purpose of aggression 
against China, according to the author. He went on in this way: 
"The American missionary fitted snugly into the imperialist scheme 
49~ •• p. 147. 
50wu You-Tsung, rtNe'u Life for the Chine se Christian Church, f1 
People's China, IV, No. 11 (December 1, 1951), 15-17_ 
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of aggression. He lived in a garden-compound with modern facili-
ties. He was boss of his ohurch or Christian organization, ••• 
because he controlled its finance which came from abroad together 
with its policies. He walked with an air of superiority to every-
thing around him.,,5l 'l"he statement quoted above is fairly a gene-
ral attitude of the Chinese people toward the Church. To use a 
Chinese Christian leader, a graduate in the United states, to at~ 
taok Christianity is, for the Communists, a wise scheme. 
After september 1950 the Communists created the "Church Inde-
pendence Movement." This movement demanded that the Chinese Catho 
lios reject the Pope. The Communists declared that the Indepen-
denoe Movement was a patr'iotic movement au.d a movement against 
American impec·ialism. 'llherefore, as a part of this movement 
Communists have acted to force Catholics to sign in support of it. 
Acoording to Communist ideology there are close politioal 
ties between the Vatican and the White House. In Communist propa-
ganda literature the Pope is called "imperialist," "running dog of 
American imperialism," or tla good friend of the White House." For 
example, an article appeared in Wen Hui Pao, April 7, 1950, whioh 
---~ 
stated: "President Trumants special envoy to the Holy See, Myron 
Taylor, does not believe he needs to make an ap'pointment to see 
Pope. He may walk into the papal court and say tIs the Pope at 
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home?' The Secretary of the United states in writing to the Pope 
addresses him simply 'Dear friend., f1 52 
But there haa been more than just propaganda. Violent out-
rages have taken place since the start of the Christian Indepen-
dence Movement. In early 1951 an American priest in Honan. Provine 
was arrested and was it charged that he had a share in the respon~ 
sibi1ity for the attack on the Boxers in 1900. The punishment for 
him was one million U.S. dollars. After the priest sold every-
thing he possessed the Communists forced him to write letters to 
the Catholic Mission in Hong Kong for money. The result .. of 
course, was life sentence. 
On March II, 1951, five nuna at Canton were arrested and 
accused of the murder of two thousand infants in their orphanage 
within one year. Public trial was held to show the "horrors of 
the orphanage of the mission." Two weeks later, an American pries 
was put in jail on account of "crueltylt to Chinese Children. When 
a four-year old child died in a Catholic hospital of pneumonia, 
two sisters were blamed ror causing this death, by "allowing 
scalding'water to burn the child. ItS3 
A few weeks later, seven European Sisters were arrested and 
tried by the Communists before a crowd of 3,000 Nanking citizens. 
52Quoted in Palmer, God's Undersr9un~ ~ !!!!, p. 215. 
53Ibid., pp. 197. 202. 
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'rhe Communi s ts displayed one hundred corpses ot dead babies, 
whioh they had dug up from an orphanage cemetery, before the orowd 
as "evidenoe" of the Sisters' "crime." These Sisters were describ. 
ed in the Chinese newspapers as ttAmerican sympathizers and murder-
ers." The papers also charged that "imperialist nuns give reac-
tionary propaganda to orphans that America will help Chiang Kai-
Shek return. lt54 
In April, 1951, an AmeriCan priest was thrown into jail and 
in August was put on trial. His "crimen was reported by the 
Communists as that of having burned bodies alive.55 At Pakhai, 
Kuangtung province, an American priest and two Sisters were accuse< 
01" "taking out babies' eyes to make medicine."56 
There was a more fantastic charge against the Slsters. In 
early 1952, a trial was conducted against six nuns at Chentu, 
Szechuan Province. A Chinese servant of the orphanage, under the 
Communist order, "testified" before an audlence of 40,000 citizens 
that the Sisters "ate two babies a day when they were fat, three 
when they were skinny.u They were also charged with the death of 
120,000 orphans.57 





56.!!?!!!., p. 205. 
57Ibid• , p. 206. 
-
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To the Communist mind such charges are not too fantastic to 
be believed. In rural China there are in circulation superstitiou~ 
stories regarding people killing people. Witch-like women tell 
the peasantry that human hearts are sometimes eaten, and human 
.yes when eaten make another person's sight better. Also in£anti-
cide is prevalent. During the beginning of the Red regime the lo-
cal officials and officers of the cities came largely from the 
rural areas, had little education; when they tried to do everythinf 
in promoting anti-Christianity aotivities, they were inclined to 
be superstitious and ohildish. 
It is olear, however, that in the present China the Communist 
outrages against the Churoh are fiercer than those ',vhioh occurred 
during the earlier period of the Chinese revolution. Formerly 
under the Communist influence and operation the Chinese people 
indiscriminately accused all foreign missionaries as imperialLqts. 
But now the Communists emphatically teach them that there is close 
relationship between the Amerioan imperialism and Christianity. 
Practically, the American missionaries in China have suffered the 
~ost severe persecutions. Obviously the Communist anti-Christiani-
ty movement is following the one-sided policy. 
Concerning all the events of the Communist anti-A.1'J1erican and 
~rowRussian program, an expert on the Chinese Com~unist movement 
indicated that the Hed regime is "the blind alley of totalitarian-
ism," and that at the end o£ the blind alley o£ totalitarianism 
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there is nothing but self-destruction or the darkness of a new 
barbarian epooh.58 
58Harold R. Issao, ItThe Blind Alley of Totalitarianism," The 
Annals of the American Aeademl of Politieal and Social Soienee;--
cCtXXVi\Ju1y, 19>1), 81-90. -
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CHAPTER V 
3UMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
Resume of Chanter I, II, and III 
------ ~ « - -- ---~
In the first chapter we have described the characteristics of 
Chinese anti-foreignism. It seems clear that an ethnocentric 
notion of supremacy made the Chinese, at least from the sixteenth 
century, reject and fight foreigners. Yet the result was that the 
, 
forei&lers began to infiltrate China, and China had become subject 
to foreigners since 1842, as history shows. 
Through repeated defeat., China's nationalism grew strong, 
though not too effective. Nationalism brought China to a revolu-
tionary chaos. Following the revolutionary storm anti-foreign 
movement reached a new high tide as discussed in the second ehapte 
In the beginning of that chapter we presented an analysis of the 
teachings ot Dr. Sun Yat Sen, founder and leader of the Chinese 
anti-~perialist revolution. Obviously sun Yat Sen was influenced 
by Marxism-Leninism, and he in turn brought his influence to the 
Chinese intellectuals and revolutionists. 
Psychological conditions and histor~eal events so mingled tha 
the Communists' theories, as cited in the second chapter, seemed 
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rather adaptable and practical to the Chinese revolutionary mind. 
Thus, the Chinese Communists, with the aid of Moscow, were able to 
use nationalism as their ally in oarrying out Communist objectives 
Communist spirit activities kept alive the spirit of the 
Boxers during the years before 1928. It is obvious, from Chapter 
II, that the Communi sts plot.ted boycotts and riots in the foreign 
faotories and conoessions; they aroused the mobs, soldiers, and 
stUdents to destroy foreign properties, to murder and expel 
foreigners, to attaok "forei8Otl ChI'istianity. Revolutionary ohaos 
pI'evailed, and, a history shows, such condition has always pI'ovld-
ed an opportunity for the Communist development, paI'tioularly so 
in China. 
AfteI' the Kuo lin Tang began to suppI'ess them fI'om the summeI' 
of 1927, the Chinese Communists went to work underground to con-
tinue to tan the anti-foI'eign movement. For student oiroles in th~ 
oities the Communists spread propaganda tI'acts and pam~hlets to 
incite a "patriotic tl movement. At the same time they started to 
train and oI'ganlse the peasantI'Y in rural China to fight toreignerf 
In Chapter I and the beginning ot Chapter III we have indi-
cated that basically the Chinese people had---and still have---
prejudice against the Japanese. Coincidently, after 1931, Japan 
began to make her new moves against China, step by step. Hence-
fOI'th, the anti-foreign movement had been oonoentrated on Japan, 
as desoribed in Chapter III. 
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The Kuo Min Tang Government tried through the League ot 
Nations to restrain Japan at least temporarily. Also Chiang Kai-
Shek believed that the first task ot resistance against Japan 
should be to unify China, since there was the existence of the 
provincialists and the opposition ot the Communists. Hhile Chiang 
was using persuasive tactics to win control ot the warlords, he 
was applying his armed torces in five campaigns against the Chinese 
Communists. At the same time Chiang tollowed a policy ot mollify-
ing the anti-Japanese movement in the cities. This policy in the 
face of Japanese aggression did not meet the public liking. The 
Chinese Communists, therefore, took full psychological adVantage 
in its anti-Japanese campaign. The cry for a "united front agains 
Japan" had becqme powerful propaganda, both in the cities and 
countryside. 
Before the last War the Communists 'Won the "patriots" in the 
cities, though the Red Army suffered deeply from the vigorous 
opposition of the Kuo Min Tang. During the War the Communists 
again manipulated public opinion, which demanded oollaboration ot 
the Kuo Min Tang and Communists tor fUll defense of China against 
Japan, and, utilizing the peasantry, expanded the Red Army in rura. 
areas. The Red A~y, as a matter ot tact, had not been wholeheart. 
edly applied to fight the Japanese; instead it had been kept tor 
the bargainning of political power with the Kuo Min Tang atter the 
War. It might be fair to say that the ant1-Japanese campaign had 
123 
sustained the Chinese Communists tl~ough several years of hardship 
and provided them an opportunity for further development. 
Evaluation ~ ~ Communist Anti-America~ £pogram 
Sinoe the Communists came into power they have evolved an 
anti-American and pro-Russian program, especially a program which 
is destined tolthate America. despise America, and curse America." 
In the beginning of the fourth chapter it has been pointed out 
that the Chinese, in general, have both a favorable and an un-
favorable attitude toward Americans. The unfavorable attit<.1de, 
however, is not rooted in any immediate diplomatic dispute between 
China and America. It has resulted from the Chinese misunder-
standing of American social life, it has been influenced by the 
"ooncealed contempt" adopted by Americans in China; and it is 
partly a psychological inter.playing of the idea that "foreigners 
are pro-foreigners. It Poli ticall,-, the Chinese people have, at 
least, a comparatively favorable attitude toward Americans. But 
the Chinese Communists have indoctrinated the Chinese people to 
hate Americans, principally on the basis of the Communists' poli-
tical bias and historical fabrications. If the Conmunists stmply 
attacked the American way ot life, since this has been traditional 
1y misunderstood by the Chinese people, their teachings would pro-
bably be more .tfective. 
Moreover, the characteristic of the Communist literature 1s 
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over-exaggeration which can be seen in any example cited in the 
fourth chapter. Even in attacking the American way of life and 
social problem their teachings have deviated too far from facts 
and public reasoning. Human knowledge has always rejected a story 
covered with dubious shadow. It the Chinese Communists should 
teach their people in seemingly objective and moderate terms and 
attitudes, they might get more or less creqit with the public. As 
a matter fact, an astonishing rumor, which illustrated the Chinese 
public wish, was current in Red China during the beginning of the 
Korean Warz "Now, America will come back againl" or course the 
rumor was a dream, but a dream which was dreamed in Communist Chin, • 
But more important than over-exaggeration is the enforced 
teachings of the "befriend Russia" idea. Although we did not in-
troduce many examples ot the Oommunist pro-Russian propaganda, the 
anti-American program is basically aimed to promote the pro-Russial 
movement, which can be seen in the Oommunist interpretations cited 
in Chapter IV. The Ohinese attitude toward Russians is rather a 
resentment that has resulted from a history of Russian hostilities 
toward China. Russia, though tactically renouncing all unequal 
treaties with the past China in 1918 and 1919, put new pressure on 
China to recognize the independence of Outer Mongolia and Russian 
privileges in 31nkiang during the Kuo Min Tang r~gime. Atter the 
World II War the Chinese people have been aware ot Communist 
Russia's activities in Arthur, Dairen, and Eastern Railway. But 
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the Chinese Communists have contended that Russian privileges in 
Manchuria and other territories are for the benefit of the Chinese. 
It is doubtful that such an interpretation could merit credit with 
the public for the Chinese Communists. 
Psychological reaction on the one-sided policy is inevitable. 
Mao Tse-Tung admitted that a "reactionary" trend is prevalent, and 
it will continue to eXist. l A typical reaction is illustrated by 
a Chinese Communist popular writer, Hsiao Chiun, who devoted him-
self to the CCP tor about twenty years. Hsiao's article "On 
Various Imperialiams" appeared in his own ;'fing ~ f!.2. (Literature 
!!!!) in early 1949. Hsiao posed one main question in attacking 
his party: If America represents imperialism, why does not Russia 
also represent tmperialism since she has violated China's sovereigr-
ty and she moved away Chinese property from Manchuria?2 The result 
that Hsiao was prosecuted.3 At the same time a general purge has 
been carried out to conquer any anti-Russian and anti-Communist 
attitudes. 
The Ghinese Communists might expect that exaggerated "one-
sided" propaganda will aohieve sucoess among the second genoration. 
lMao Tse-Tung, ~ ~ ~ !!n ~ Chuan Cheng, p. 11. 
2'1ling M:lao, ChunS KunS Wing !!. ~ !!.f!m, PP. 111-112. 
3Hsiao t s fate has not been fully known, but there is a 
general aggreement among the Chinese intellectuals that Hsiao was 
sentenced to death. 
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However, how to rsform. suooessfully the "reaotionary" idea already 
established is an enormous task for Communists. A crucial pruge 
of "reaotionaries" would achieve the reverse in the long run. 
Although governmental policies can decrease and increase Chinese 
anti.foreignism, such policy must be based on reality. During 
World War II, the Nanking and Pe1ping puppet governments tried to 
create a general pro-Japanese a~titude, but it was never achieved. 
On the other hand, the Chinese Communists presumably decided 
that sinee they successfully incited agitations and riots against 
all foreigners including Americans in early period of the Chinese 
Revolution, they wou~d achieve stmllar successes in an anti-Ameri-
can movement at the present and in the future. Nevertheless, 
peoplets minds might undergo a change, since the situation in the 
earlier days cannot be exactly comparable with the present situa-
tion. The point is that the judgement of the Chinese people on 
Communism and Communist activities cannot be always the same. The 
~ommunist statement and propaganda were rather consistent with the 
~ublio demand in view of the former revolutionary chaos. The 
Communist policy at the present time does not appear to conform to 
the publicts psychological trend. 
A more important point is that the Communists have not taught 
their people in this way that ftall foreigners" are imperialists 
~gainst China. They have singled out that only Americans are 
imperialist aggressors against China. Even Japan, the big enemy 
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of China as the Chinese people regarded, has been eliminated from 
the CO'U'l1unists' attack target. For example, when the rearmament 
pact was performed by the United states and Japan, the Chinese 
Communists organized student and worker demonstrations in various 
cities. Among the slogans used for demonstrations we can only 
find "Down with American imperialism. 1t There is no words like 
"Down with Japanese imperialism," which had been used by the 
Ohinese Oommunists as an important propaganda weapon fop many yearl • 
A current question thereupon has been formed by the Chim se people 
in Red China: "What do we have to do with Jap~n since we got 
nothing, though we defeated her?" If the Commun»ts should indis-
cr1m1nately act against all fore1gners in man1fest1ng Chinese 
nationalism they might be supported by their people in a program 
of antl-Americani5m. or course, this is antagonist1c to the 
foreign pollcy of the Red 'regime. But a one-sided policy is also 
an antagonistlc to traditional Chinese feeling. 
Finally, it is certainly not accurate to i.nsiat tha.t Communia1 
propaga.nda in China gains nothing. One result brought about by 
the Communist repeated denouncements of the United states should 
be pointed out. When Wu Hsiu Chuan bitterly attacked the United 
states in the United Nations, the writer in Hong Kong learned from 
his countrymen who are not Communists that "Nhether Communists are 
right or wrong, tor one hundred years this is the first eim. China 
dares to attaok a foreign powerl ft Betore the writer came to the 
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United states, a Chinese sCholar suggested to him that the Chinese 
in the United states would be more respected it they claimed that 
they have come to the United states from med China. 
Similarly, a Chinese student, who is anti-communist, advised 
the writer to adjust himself to live in the United states: ftDon't 
fear Amerioans. Now the Chinese Communists sound pretty loud 
against the United states. Americans fear the Communists. We are 
Chinese'" In the spring of 1954 the writer interviewed a number 
of Chinese students in Chicago to determine the Chinese intellec-
tuals. attitude toward the Communists and Americans. Persons who 
are anti-Communists gave some words like: "China has prestige now, 
because Chinese Communists dare to speak to the world,tt "China 
really could fight America, a big Power, in Korea:" 
We do not know how many Chinese, inside and outside Red China, 
Ihold this nationalistic feeling of self-respect, but we do know 
there are such Chinese. The Chinese Co~munlst leaders might find 
that the above attitudes might give satisfaction to their role 
played in the international sphere of the present day. 'ro those 
Chinese who dislike Communists and yet feel a gain in prestige 
caused by the blustering and threats of the Chinese Crnnmunists, it 
is a psychological dilemma. \Vhen they think they have gained 
~restige, they also teel, as often the writer has learned, that 
phina is too dependent on HusRia and she has lost something to 
~ussia. By and large, the feeling of national supremacy is still 
l~ 
important among the Chinese people. The question of whether or 
not the Chinese Communists can perfectly satisfy this feeling is 
a big task for them. 
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